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I. INTRODUCTION 
[I]n the early 1980s, that feeling of utter despair [felt by 
women diagnosed with aggressive breast cancer] started to 
change as women and their families began hearing of a new 
treatment that held out some hope…. Unfortunately, those 
stories of success quickly turned into a misleading bandwagon 
of enthusiasm.  Sometimes fueled by greed and even fraud.  
Tragically, thousands of women were railroaded into making 
uninformed decisions.1 
nterest in high dose chemotherapy (HDC)2 was already 
strong when Dr. Werner Bezwoda published research re-
sults supporting the procedure in 1995.3  In a 1996 publication, 
Dr. Bezwoda touted his research as proof that HDC was supe-
rior to conventional treatments for metastatic breast cancer.4  
Influenced by Dr. Bezwoda’s claims, and despite the fact that 
other research had shown no benefit for women undergoing 
HDC, as many as 6,000 women a year paid between $100,000 
and $200,000 apiece to undergo the procedure.5  HDC had be-
come big business, providing a substantial profit margin to phy-
sicians and hospitals performing the procedure.6  No one wanted 
to question the benefits of HDC; it provided hope…and money.7  
  
 1. 20/20 Friday: A Betrayal of Hope; Breast Cancer Patients Urged to 
Have Bone Marrow Transplants for Money Rather Than Better Health (ABC 
television broadcast, Apr. 14, 2001) (statement made by reporter Dr. Timothy 
Johnson). 
 2. HDC treatment requires that patients have bone marrow stem cells 
removed from their body and stored prior to receiving extremely high doses of 
chemotherapy.  National Women’s Health Network, High-Dose Chemotherapy 
Debacle Highlights Systemic Weaknesses, 25 NETWORK NEWS 3 (2000).  If the 
patient survives the chemotherapy regimen, the stem cells are then trans-
planted back into her body in an effort to restore the bone marrow that was 
destroyed by the chemotherapy.  Id. 
 3. Thomas H. Maugh II & Rosie Mestel, Key Breast Cancer Study was a 
Fraud, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001, at A1. 
 4. Michelle Marble, Breast Cancer (Therapy): Proven Superiority of High 
Dose Chemotherapy for Metastatic Disease, CANCER WEEKLY, Dec. 9, 1996, at 
7–8. 
 5. National Women’s Health Network, supra note 2, at 3. 
 6. Gina Kolata & Kurt Eichenwald, Health Business Thrives on Unproven 
Treatment, Leaving Science Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, at 1. 
 7. Id.  See also National Women’s Health Network, supra note 2, at 3; 
20/20 Friday, supra note 1 (“Doctors knew that high dose had not been defini-
 
I 
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Dr. Bezwoda repeated his claims again before an international 
conference of cancer experts in 1999.8  That is when Dr. Bez-
woda’s claims about HDC, and his reputation as a prestigious 
cancer researcher, began to fall apart.9  In an effort to discover 
why the doctor’s results were so different from other research 
projects, several researchers asked to review Dr. Bezwoda’s 
clinical trial data.10  In doing so, they discovered that much of 
the data used to support HDC’s effectiveness was non-existent 
or had been falsified.11  In a 2000 letter to his former employer, 
the doctor claimed that he had faked his research results “in a 
foolish desire to make the presentation more acceptable.”12 
Ensuring the integrity of research projects is an increasingly 
prominent topic in the field of medicine.13  In the last few dec-
ades, the number of medical research projects has increased 
exponentially.14  Paralleling this increase is an expansion in the 
geographic locations where research projects are situated, in-
cluding many new research projects conducted at international 
locations.15  The global expansion of medical research has 
  
tively proven to more effective but they were under pressure to continue what 
by then was big business.”). 
 8. Denise Grady, Conference Divided Over High-Dose Breast Cancer 
Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1999, at A19. 
 9. Id.  At the conference, all of the research presented on HDC, except Dr. 
Bezwoda’s, showed that the procedure had no benefit for patients.  Id.  As a 
result of this discrepancy, researchers from the United States traveled to 
South Africa (where Bezwoda worked at the University of Witwatersrand 
Medical School) to review the doctor’s research data.  Michael Hagmann, Can-
cer Researcher Sacked for Alleged Fraud, 287 SCIENCE 1901, 1901 (2000).  
Bezwoda was fired by the University shortly thereafter.  Id. 
 10. Hagmann, supra note 9, at 1901 
 11. Id.; Maugh & Mestel, supra note 3. 
 12. South Africa: Cancer Professor Was A Serial Fraud, AFRICA NEWS, May 
4, 2001.  For a further discussion of the implications of Dr. Bezwoda’s scien-
tific misconduct, see Richard Horton, After Bezwoda, 355 LANCET 942, 942–43 
(2000). 
 13. See, e.g., Chris Beyrer & Nancy E. Kass, Human Rights, Politics and 
Reviews of Research Ethics, 360 LANCET 246, 246 (2002). 
 14. See, e.g., Eve E. Slater, IRB Reform, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1402 (2002).  
Federal funding of medical research has more than doubled since 1995; pri-
vate sponsorship of research has increase at the same rate.  Id. 
 15. See generally Timothy Caulfield, Globalization, Conflicts of Interest 
and Clinical Research: An Overview of Trends and Issues, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. 
J. 31 (2001) (discussing general trends related to the globalization of clinical 
research and conflicts of interest). 
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prompted many new questions about how to ensure the safety 
of human research subjects16 during clinical trials.17  Concerns 
involving clinical trials in the United States and abroad focus 
on five major areas: appropriateness of research designs;18 
proper scientific and ethical review of research proposals;19 rea-
sonableness of participant selection;20 assurance that voluntary 
informed consent21 was obtained from all research participants;22 
and receipt of appropriate treatment during and after a clinical 
trial.23   Debate over the elements of these five topics is likely to 
  
 16. 1 NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, ETHICAL AND POLICY 
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH: CLINICAL TRIALS IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, at i (2001) [hereinafter NBAC INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH]. 
 17. For the purposes of this Note, a “clinical trial” is defined as the admini-
stration of and intervention for diagnosis, treatment, or prevention: 
The intervention could be a drug or biologic; a device; a behavioral in-
tervention, such as counseling or education; a procedure, such as sur-
gery, laser treatment, or a diagnostic test; or a specific service, such 
as home or hospice care.  A clinical trial can be designed and sup-
ported for commercial reasons, such as approval of a new drug, or in 
response to interest by an individual investigator or research group. 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO 
PROTECTING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 34 (2002).  See also infra Part II.A. 
 18. Research design includes a complete description of types or levels of 
treatment that will be provided to clinical trial participants and how the new 
treatment will be compared to existing treatment, if any exists.  INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, supra note 17, at 8–9. 
 19. Ethical review is conducted by a committee whose purpose is to evalu-
ate whether the proposed research is ethical according to ethical guidelines for 
medical research.  Id. at 13. 
 20. This concern relates to whether the choice to conduct a clinical trial 
within a particular country or population group is reasonably related to the 
population’s health needs.  Id. at 7–8. 
 21. Informed consent is a statutory and common law doctrine that requires 
a physician to fully disclose treatment risks and complete details of treatment 
procedure to patients before administering a proposed treatment.  Shannon 
Benbow, Conflict + Interest:  Financial Incentives and Informed Consent in 
Human Subject Research, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 181, 187 
(2003). 
 22. Concern that cultural issues can impede a participant’s understanding 
of the clinical trial and the risks involved in becoming a participant.  NBAC 
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 16, at 11. 
 23. Id. at 9, 12. 
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continue, particularly in light of ever-increasing research budg-
ets and expansion of research into developing countries.24 
A vital component of good medical research is analysis of re-
search protocols, by an independent review body, for potential 
ethics violations.25  In the United States, most research projects 
that involve human participants must be submitted to ethics 
review committees, called Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), 
for approval.26  Internationally, many nations have their own 
regulations providing for ethical review of medical experiments 
through agencies and/or committees or groups generally re-
ferred to as Research Ethics Committees (RECs).27  IRBs and 
RECs are charged with approving or denying research protocols 
based upon whether the proposed research is scientifically valid 
and whether there are adequate protections to ensure the safety 
and well-being of participants.28     
Despite their status as the gatekeepers in the conduct of 
clinical trials, RECs and IRBs lack uniformity nationally and 
  
 24. See, e.g., Trudo Lemmens & Paul B. Miller, The Human Subject Trade: 
Ethical and Legal Issues Surrounding Recruitment Incentives, 31 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 398, 401 (2003) (payment of finders fees to physicians for obtaining 
research participants for commercial trials may drive physicians to recruit 
inappropriate subjects and to be lenient with informed consent procedures); 
Ruqaiijah Yearby, Good Enough to Use for Research, But Not Good Enough to 
Benefit from the Results of that Research: Are the Clinical HIV Vaccine Trials 
in Africa Unjust?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1127 (2004) (selection of research par-
ticipants in Africa unjust and unethical because African populations, individ-
ual African  research participants in particular, do not receive the benefits of 
therapies they helped to test); Jeremy Sugarman, Lying, Cheating and Steal-
ing in Clinical Research, 1 CLINICAL TRIALS 475, 475–76 (2004) (discussing the 
considerable attention focused on the integrity of clinical research and need 
for clear guidance and transparency in situations involving scientific miscon-
duct). 
 25. NBAC INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 16, at 5. 
 26. See 42 U.S.C. § 289 (2005) (requires IRB approval for all research that 
receives government funding).  See also, 21 C.F.R. § 56 (2005) (the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) requires that research on new drugs receive ap-
proval by an IRB). 
 27. See Robert J. Levine, Research Ethics Committees, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF BIOETHICS 2311 (Stephen G. Post ed., 3d ed. 2004).  Different countries may 
use different names, and some emulate the United States by calling their 
review committees IRBs, but for the purposes of this Note non-U.S. review 
committees will be referred to as RECs. 
 28. See infra Part III. 
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internationally.29  The IRB system in the United States is gen-
erally held out to other nations as the best existing format for 
ethical review of medical research.30  Despite this distinction, 
there are minimal specific regulations or procedures that all 
IRBs must follow.31  There is no one set of ethics guidelines that 
all review committees must use.32  Each institution that wishes 
to establish an ethics review committee is required to develop 
many of its own guidelines and operating procedures—resulting 
in substantial inconsistency between institutions.33  This prob-
lem only increases in magnitude for RECs in other countries 
that have less developed regulations and little experience man-
aging ethics issues in medical research.34   
In the last several years, one of the most highly publicized 
safety issues has been how best to protect participants when 
researchers and research institutions have personal interests 
that may conflict with their obligation to protect participants’ 
safety.35  However, despite heavy publicity, only minimal regu-
  
 29. See, e.g., Bernard M. Dickens, The Challenge of Equivalent Protection, 
in 2 NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH: CLINICAL TRIALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES A-10 
(2001) [hereinafter 2 NBAC INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH].  Inconsistency often 
leads to conflicting regulations of research conducted at foreign sites, specifi-
cally when U.S. regulations are applicable due to U.S. funding or the need for 
FDA approval.  Id.  Determinations of when U.S. regulations are applicable to 
a clinical trial is discussed infra Part III and V. 
 30. Marie Hirtle et al., A Comparative Analysis of Research Ethics Review 
Mechanisms and the ICH Good Clinical Practice Guideline, 7 EUR. J. HEALTH 
L. 265, 267 (2000).  See also INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONIZATION 
OF TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS FOR 
HUMAN USE, E6 GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE: CONSOLIDATED GUIDANCE (1996) 
[hereinafter ICH GCP] (The ICH Good Clinical Practice guide adopted ERC 
provisions almost identical to the Common Rule (infra Part III)), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/959fnl.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). 
 31. See infra Part V. 
 32. See infra Part II.  
 33. See infra Part V. 
 34. See DHHS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
CLINICAL TRIALS: A GROWING CHALLENGE IN PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS 15 
(2001) [hereinafter GLOBALIZATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS] (noting that sponsors 
of clinical research have concerns about the adequacy of review by RECs in 
nations with little experience conducting medical research). 
 35. See, e.g., Pamela R. Ferguson, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Clinical 
Trials: The View of Researchers, 11 MED. L. REV. 48, 51–52 (2003).  Conflicts of 
interest are discussed in detail in Part IV of this Note. 
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latory guidance has occurred.36  Regulatory changes to the man-
datory functions of RECs—specifically, changes to U.S. regula-
tions—can minimize the risk of unethical research occurring in 
the United States and other nations.  International collabora-
tion on development of uniform, internationally-accepted regu-
lations for RECs has been initiated by a few nations, but re-
mains limited.37  Conflict of interest policies implemented in 
conjunction with REC oversight can strengthen the ethical re-
view process and promote the purpose of ethical review—
participant safety and well-being. 
This Note posits that substantive and procedural weaknesses 
in the operations of ethical review committees should be 
amended, through revision of U.S. regulations for national and 
foreign clinical trials, in order to develop consistent policies for 
the management of conflicts of interest and enhance the protec-
tion of research participants.  Part II provides an overview of 
bioethics and clinical trials, including several influential ethics 
guidelines that have directed post-World War II medical re-
search.  Part III gives a general overview of ethical review 
committees in the United States and abroad.  This Part in-
cludes information on the different control mechanisms used 
within the United States to regulate IRBs.  This Part also ex-
amines control mechanisms for RECs in other countries.  Part 
IV investigates the issue of conflict of interest as it relates to 
medical research and clinical trials at the national and interna-
tional level.  Part V proposes regulatory solutions to clarify the 
role of IRBs and RECs and ameliorate deficiencies that cur-
rently exist in the regulation of conflicts of interest. Specifically, 
this Part suggests several regulatory changes that, if imple-
mented, have the potential to increase national and interna-
tional ethical review committees’ ability to fulfill their purpose 
of ensuring participant safety by providing them with all the 
information important for evaluating research proposals.  
II. BIOETHICS 
Historically, many cultural groups believed that illness 
stemmed from violations of social or natural law, and that the 
methods of the healer must be “right” and “good” in order to 
  
 36. See infra Part V. 
 37. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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return health to the sick person.38  Over the last twenty-five 
centuries, ethics in Western countries has been consistently 
linked to the moral beliefs of Western society.39  Bioethics is the 
study and evaluation of the moral duties, obligations and prin-
ciples governing the actions of individuals and groups within 
the medical field.40  The term “bioethics” was originally coined 
by a Wisconsin cancer researcher and was intended to encom-
pass the ethical review of all biological sciences, such as ecology, 
agriculture and medicine.41  However, the term “bioethics” is 
now synonymous with biomedical ethics and generally only cov-
ers issues in biomedical research, medicine and health care.42  
The study and practice of bioethics includes a variety of profes-
sional backgrounds—including philosophers, theologians, attor-
neys, clinicians, and researchers—with each providing a unique 
perspective on the moral obligations of caregivers and research-
ers toward patients.43 
The import of bioethics has continued to grow over the last 
few decades, reflecting the vast increase and complexity of mod-
ern medical advances and the policy questions those advances 
raise for governments, medical professionals, and the public.44  
In the United States, the field of bioethics developed into a ma-
jor area of academic discourse following revelations of several 
highly questionable research experiments during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s,45 including the infamous Tuskegee syphilis 
  
 38. ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS 5–6 (1998). 
 39. Id. at 6. 
 40. See, e.g., LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS 10 
(2002). 
 41. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS IN U.S. PUBLIC POLICY—BACKGROUND PAPER 2 (1993) [hereinafter OTA 
BIOMEDICAL PAPER] (Report # OTA-BP-BBS-1O5), available at http:// 
www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk1/1993/9312/9312. 
PDF (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).  The term “bioethics” was coined by Van 
Rensselaer Potter (1911-2001), a biochemist who worked as a professor of 
oncology at the University of Wisconsin.  Id. at 2 (citing VAN RENSSELAER 
POTTER, BIOETHICS: BRIDGE TO THE FUTURE (1971)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  Publicity surrounding cloning, euthanasia, stem-cell research, and 
other new medical advances has increased public awareness of bioethical is-
sues, which in turn has lead to increased governmental regulations and guide-
lines.  See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 35, at 52–54. 
 45. OTA BIOMEDICAL PAPER, supra note 41, at 2. 
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study46 and government–sponsored radiation experiments.47  
Modern bioethical topics are varied and include such issues as 
  
 46. See, e.g., Allan M. Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tus-
kegee Syphilis Experiment, in TUSKEGEE’S TRUTHS (Susan M. Reverby ed., 
2000).  For forty years, between 1932 and 1972, the U.S. Public Health Ser-
vice (PHS) conducted an experiment on 400 black men with late stage syphi-
lis. Id. at 15.  These men, for the most part illiterate sharecroppers from 
Macon County in Alabama, were never told what disease they were suffering 
from or of its seriousness.  Id. at 18, 21.  As a means to enroll participants, the 
research subjects were told they would be treated for “bad blood,” the local 
term used to describe syphilis.  Id. at 22.  However, doctors never intended to 
cure the men’s syphilis, but rather intended to withhold all forms of treatment 
so they could analyze the natural progression of syphilis over time.  Id. at 18.  
The experiment’s data was to be collected from autopsies of research subjects, 
and thus the men were deliberately left to degenerate under the ravages of 
tertiary syphilis, which can include tumors, heart disease, paralysis, blind-
ness, insanity, and death.  Id. at 23.   “As I see it,” one of the doctors involved 
explained, “we have no further interest in these patients until they die.”  Id.  
Researchers continued to withhold treatment for the men throughout the forty 
years of the study.  Id. at 25.  The men were prevented from participating in 
several nationwide campaigns to eradicate venereal disease.  Id. at 26.  When 
penicillin was discovered in the 1940s—the first real cure for syphilis—the 
Tuskegee men were deliberately denied the medication.  Id. at 27.  By the end 
of the experiment, twenty-eight of the men had died directly of syphilis and 
more than one hundred were dead of related complications.  Id. at 15.    
 47. See generally OFFICE OF HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS: THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
ROADMAP TO THE STORY AND THE RECORDS (1995), available at http: 
//tis.eh.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/roadmap/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).  
From 1945 until 1974, the U.S. government funded multiple research projects 
on the effects of radioactive substances on the human body.  Id.  Patients were 
injected with varying doses of uranium, plutonium, and other radioactive 
elements to determine the physiological effects these substances have on the 
body.  Id.  These experiments took place throughout the country and were run 
by government agencies, the military, as well as publicly-funded hospitals and 
other research programs.  Id.  Unlike the vast majority of medical research 
projects, federally-funded human radiation experiments were deemed “classi-
fied,” and all procedures and results were held in secret by the U.S. Govern-
ment.  Id.  As a result, decisions on proper conduct of research by higher au-
thorities were never shared with the personnel actually conducting the ex-
periments and there was little to no guidance to researchers on what ethical 
guidelines should have been followed.  Id.  The records on these experiments, 
since de-classified, suggest that many research participants did not consent to 
being a part of the radiation experiments.  Id.  Additionally, there is substan-
tial question as to the value of some of the treatment protocols undergone by 
participants, i.e. some experiments were done to further scientific knowledge 
rather than to provide an form of treatment to the patient.  Id.   
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abortion, euthanasia, organ transplantation, cloning and stem-
cell research.48 
A.  Clinical Trials 
This Note will focus solely upon one of the many topics that 
fall within the field of bioethics, the ethics of clinical trials con-
ducted with human participants.  To better understand the eth-
ics that are applied to clinical trials, it is important to under-
stand the trials process.  First, it is important to note that there 
are several different types of clinical trials, each having a dif-
ferent objective.49  Many clinical trials have treatment objectives 
and test new drugs, medical devices or surgical therapies.50  
Other types of trials include prevention trials, diagnostic trials, 
screening trials and quality of life trials.51  This Note will focus 
its attention upon the process involved in treatment trials.   
A second important fact is that clinical trials occur in a series 
of progressive steps, with each step building upon the informa-
tion learned in the previous step.52  The first step in the clinical 
trials process is to determine whether the new drug compound 
or other product is safe for use with humans.53  This part of the 
  
 48. OTA BIOMEDICAL PAPER, supra note 41, at 2–3. 
 49. National Library of Medicine, An Introduction to Clinical Trials, Clini-
calTrials.gov website, at http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct/info/whatis;jsessionid=EA 
61A759F5AD0B1BF685C3714332AD76 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
 50. Id.  Treatment trials generally look at “experimental treatments, new 
combinations of drugs, or new approaches to surgery or radiation therapy.”  
Id. 
 51. Id.  Prevention trials are aimed at increasing our ability to prevent 
occurrence or recurrence of disease.  Id.  Diagnostic trials are designed to im-
prove a medicine’s ability to diagnose a particular disease or condition 
through improved testing or medical procedures.  Id.  Screening trials seek 
new or better ways to detect diseases or other medical conditions.  Id.  Quality 
of Life trials, also known as Supportive Care trials, are intended to improve 
the quality of life for patients who suffer chronic illnesses.  Id. 
 52. See, e.g., CenterWatch, Free Research Information, Books & Publica-
tions, CenterWatch Clinical Trials Listing Service, at http://www.center 
watch.com/bookstore/freeresearch.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005) (discussing 
the phases of clinical testing that normally occur with experimental drugs). 
 53. See, e.g., International Conference on Harmonization; Guidance on 
General Considerations for Clinical Trials, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,113, 66,115 (Dec. 
17, 1997) (guidance published by the FDA setting forth general scientific prin-
ciples for the conduct, performance and control of clinical trials). 
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process is called pre-clinical research (or non-clinical studies).54  
After a new product has been developed, it must be tested on 
two or more non-human species of animals (one rodent, one 
non-rodent) to determine if it is safe to give the same product to 
humans.55  These safety evaluations are important for determin-
ing whether the product can be used at all, or whether specific 
limitations should be placed upon the product’s use in humans.56  
This initial step can take a few weeks to several years.57 
Once pre-clinical research has shown that a product can be 
safely58 tested on humans, the clinical trial process begins in 
earnest.  The steps in the clinical trial process are often referred 
  
 54. See, e.g., id.; CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION, CDER HANDBOOK 5 (1998) [hereinafter CDER 
HANDBOOK] (includes chapter on the processes involved in new drug develop-
ment and review), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/ (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2005).  
 55. CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at 6.  Testing must be done on more 
than one species because different species may have different reactions to the 
product.  Id.  For pharmaceuticals, non-clinical studies usually include: “single 
and repeated dose toxicity studies, reproduction toxicity studies, genotoxicity 
studies, local tolerance studies, and for drugs that have special cause for con-
cern or are intended for a long duration of use, an assessment of carcinogenic 
potential.”  INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONIZATION, GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY: M3 NONCLINICAL SAFETY STUDIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF HUMAN 
CLINICAL TRIALS FOR PHARMACEUTICALS 2 (1997) [hereinafter ICH 
NONCLINICAL SAFETY STUDIES].  Other studies include pharmacology safety 
assessments and studies on absorption, distribution, metabolism and excre-
tion (pharmacokinetics).  Id. 
 56. See, e.g., ICH NONCLINICAL SAFETY STUDIES, supra note 55, at 2.  For a 
pharmaceutical product: 
The goals of the nonclinical safety evaluation include: a characteriza-
tion of the toxic effects with respect to target organs, dose depend-
ence, relationship to exposure, and potential reversibility.  This in-
formation is important for the estimation of an initial safe starting 
dose for the human trials and the identification of parameters for 
clinical monitoring of potential adverse effects. 
Id. 
 57. CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at 6. 
 58. The fact that a product has been deemed safe to test on humans does 
not mean that research participants are not at risk for adverse effects.  Na-
tional Library of Medicine, supra note 49, at Risks.  Rather, it means that the 
data from pre-clinical research shows that the risks are low and that the pro-
posed benefit of the product outweighs any potential risk.  CDER HANDBOOK, 
supra note 54, at 7. 
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to as “phases,” though labels differ in different regions.59  Clini-
cal trials of new drugs, one of the most common types of treat-
ment trials, provide a good example of trial phases.  The initial 
testing of the product on humans, called Phase I trials, are con-
ducted with a small group of volunteers.60  Phase I trials are 
used to identify side effects, support earlier determinations that 
the product is safe for human use, and to find a safe dosage 
range.61  Once the process moves on to Phase II trials, the num-
ber of participants expands (generally 100–300 people) and re-
searchers do further evaluations of effectiveness and safety.62  
Phase II trials are usually the initial stage where the product is 
tested on individuals who have the disease or medical condition 
that the product is designed to treat.63  The number of people 
that the product is tested on increases into the thousands for 
Phase III trials.64  Phase III trials are often used to compare a 
new treatment to existing treatments, to monitor side effects, 
and to confirm effectiveness of the product for its intended pur-
pose.65  After the conclusion of Phase III trials, a product that 
has proven itself safe and effective is generally approved for 
sale to the public.66 
  
 59. See, e.g., CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at 8–9; International Con-
ference on Harmonization; Guidance on General Considerations for Clinical 
Trials, 62 Fed. Reg. at 66,115–66,117. 
 60. National Library of Medicine, supra note 49, at What Are the Phases of 
Clinical Trials?.  Initial testing is generally done on a group of twenty to 
eighty volunteers.  Id.  Volunteers in Phase I trials may be patients; however, 
they are usually healthy individuals.  CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at 8. 
 61. National Library of Medicine, supra note 49, at What Are the Phases of 
Clinical Trials?.   
 62. Id. 
 63. CDER HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at 8. 
 64. Id. at 9. 
 65. National Library of Medicine, supra note 49, at What Are the Phases of 
Clinical Trials?. 
 66. See, e.g., International Conference on Harmonization; Guidance on 
General Considerations for Clinical Trials, 62 Fed. Reg. at 66,117.  Further 
testing of the product often occurs after it has been marketed to the public.  
Id.  These tests, known as Phase IV trials, are not considered necessary for 
approval of the product but may be important for making further determina-
tions of the best dosage and optimizing the product’s use.  Id. 
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B.   Ethics in Human-Subject Clinical Trials 
One of the first questions many clinical trial participants ask 
is: “Is someone going to make sure that my safety is pro-
tected?”67  To protect the safety and well-being of clinical trial 
participants, all research done on human-subjects is governed 
by one or more ethical codes.68  One of the first texts dealing di-
rectly with ethics in medical practice was written in 1803.69  
Medical Ethics, written by the English physician Thomas Per-
cival, covered traditional medical decorum regarding physi-
cians’ relations with their patients, as well as physician-
physician relationships.70  Percival believed adherence to proper 
ethical decorum would render the profession worthy of the pub-
lic’s trust.71  Ethics as a guide to decorum continued through the 
1940s; however, medical ethics changed significantly in the 
decades following World War II.72  The following sections discuss 
the post-World War II documents on ethics in medical research 
that have been most widely accepted by the international com-
munity.   
1.   Internationally-Recognized Ethics Guidelines— 
1940 to 1980 
a. Nuremberg Code 
While medical research on humans is nothing new, the hor-
rific experiments conducted on prisoners in Nazi concentration 
camps pushed ethics to the forefront of research discussions.73  
In United States v. Brandt, the first case heard before the Mili-
tary Tribunal on War Crimes at Nuremberg, often referred to as 
the “Medicine Case,” ten criteria for ethical and humane treat-
  
 67. See, e.g., National Library of Medicine, supra note 49, at How is the 
Safety of Participants Protected?. 
 68. Id. 
 69. JONSEN, supra note 38, at 7. 
 70. Id.  Physician were to be comforting, firm, gentle and discrete with 
patients.  Id.  Physician-physician relationships refers to the professional 
manner in which physicians are expected to interact with one another, in 
particular the showing of respect between colleagues.  Id.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 11.  One known exception to this general assertion is a 1900 book 
vilifying unethical Russian experimentation.  Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Benbow, supra note 21, at 185–86. 
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ment of research subjects were outlined as part of the final 
judgment.74  Those ten criteria became known as the Nuremberg 
Code (Code),75 one of the most cited codes for ethical research.76   
Analysis of the Code requires some knowledge of the Medi-
cine Case and the experiments that were its core.  The Medicine 
Case was conducted under U.S. military auspices at the Palace 
for Justice in Nuremberg, Germany.77  Twenty-three defen-
dants, all physicians but one, were tried by the tribunal; seven 
were sentenced to death for war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity.78  The research done by the Nazi physicians included 
  
 74. The Medicine Case, in 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 
181–82 (1949). 
 75. The ten principles laid out by the court in its final ruling, later called 
the Nuremberg Code, were held by the military tribunal as the minimum 
necessary to satisfy moral, legal and ethical responsibilities.  Id.  The primary 
emphasis of the Code was voluntary consent:   
[P]ersons involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should 
be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without 
the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-
reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should 
have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the 
subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding 
and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the 
acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject 
there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and pur-
pose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be 
conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected; 
and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come 
from his participation in the experiment. 
Id.  The other nine tenets of the Code directed that experiments were to be 
conducted only for the good of society, they needed to be unprocurable by other 
methods or means of study, and must not be random or unnecessary.  Id.  
Physical and mental suffering and injury to research participants was to be 
avoided.  Id.  Researchers were not to conduct any experiments that they be-
lieved may lead to the death or disabling of research participants.  Id.  The 
degree of risk to research participants was never to exceed that determined by 
the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment, 
i.e., if the risk to participants was high, then the gain to society from the ex-
periment must also be very high.  Id.  As well, experiments were only to be 
conducted by qualified scientific personnel who could ensure that the “highest 
degree of skill and care” would be used during all stages of an experiment.  Id. 
 76. Beyrer & Kass, supra note 13, at 247. 
 77. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 4 (George J. Annas & 
Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992) [hereinafter NAZI DOCTORS]. 
 78. Id. 
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both war-related and non-war-related activities.79  Research 
subjects were given no choice about their participation, nor 
were they given any choice in any matters affecting their health 
and well-being.  Subjects were selected from prisoners in the 
concentration camps—men, women and children—by soldiers or 
physicians without being told what was going to happen to 
them.80  The research subjects endured extremely painful and 
denigrating experiments.81  Many research subjects died.82   
  
 79. See generally Eva Mozes-Kor, The Mengele Twins and Human Experi-
mentation: A Personal Account, in NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 77, at 54. The 
author and her twin sister were research subjects used by Dr. Josef Mengele 
at the Birkenau concentration camp.  Id.  Mengele considered twins the per-
fect research subjects; one child to experiment upon and one child to act as the 
control.  Id.  Mengele used the twins for two research programs: one program 
dealing with genetics and the other dealing with germ warfare.  Id. at 55.  The 
germ warfare experiments consisted of injecting one twin with a biological 
agent used for germ warfare.  Id.  When the child died from the injected 
agent, his or her twin was then killed in order for the doctors to compare the 
infected versus healthy organs of the two children at autopsy.  Id. at 56.  
Cross-transfusions and castrations were performed on twins to determine if 
an individual’s sex was interchangeable, as well as other experiments to de-
termine how the human body could be manipulated—including experiments to 
determine how much blood children could have removed from their body be-
fore they died.  Id. at 57.  Genetic experiments on individuals with physical 
abnormalities or defects were performed to determine causation.  Id.  Dr. 
Mengele’s genetic experiments were particularly focused on means to “purify” 
the Aryan race.  Id. 
 80. Id. at 55–58. 
 81. Telford Taylor, Opening Statement of the Prosecution December 9, 1946, 
in NAZI DOCTORS, supra note 77, at 67.  The U.S. prosecutor’s opening state-
ment provided a detailed description of twelve research activities for the court 
to consider as crimes against humanity.  Id. at 70–85.  The experiments in-
cluded high-altitude experiments in which prisoners were provided with gas 
masks and placed in a chamber that was pressurized to simulate high altitude 
(one experiment used pressure for an elevation of 47,000 feet); once the cham-
ber was fully pressurized, the gasmask was removed and the reactions of pris-
oners were observed until they died.  Id. at 70–72.  The subjects died in excru-
ciating pain in a process that took more than half an hour.  Id.  The research-
ers joked in their communiqués that any subject who survived the experi-
ments should be pardoned to life in prison.  Id.  The freezing experiments 
required prisoners to stand naked outside in freezing temperatures for nine to 
fourteen hours or to sit in tanks of iced water for three or more hours.  Id. at 
73.  In the mustard gas experiments, researchers intentionally wounded pris-
oners and then the wounds were infected with mustard gas.  Id. at 75–76.  
Other subjects were forced to inhale mustard gas, swallow it in liquid form, or 
were injected with the liquid form.  Id at 77.  One of the most extensive ex-
periments was on sterilization.  Id. at 82–85.  The sterilization experiments 
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As a result of these atrocities, the Code focused upon protec-
tions that would clearly enunciate that the Nazi experiments 
were unethical.  Therefore, the primary tenet of the Code is vol-
untary informed consent of research participants:  “the volun-
tary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.  This 
means that the persons…should be so situated as to be able to 
exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any 
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other 
ulterior form of constraint or coercion.”83  The Code also empha-
sizes that research participants rights and well-being must be 
protected.84  The Nuremberg Code, heavily influenced by the 
United States,85 became the stepping stone to the ethics guide-
lines used in medical research throughout the world today. 
b.  Declaration of Helsinki 
The World Medical Association (WMA) is an international 
not-for-profit organization founded in 1947 to represent physi-
cians around the world.86  In the summer of 1964 in Helsinki, 
Finland, the WMA officially adopted the “Ethical Principles for 
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects.”87  This document, 
known as the Declaration of Helsinki (Declaration), is the most 
influential international protocol to emerge since the Nurem-
  
were developed to find an inexpensive and quick method of sterilization that 
could be used “to wipe out Russians, Poles, Jews,” and other undesirables.  Id.  
Sterilization techniques included injection with test drugs, surgical castration, 
and high-dose radiation through X-rays to the genitals.  Id.  Nazi doctors also 
conducted experiments with malaria, Sulfanilamide, drinking sea-water, in-
fection with typhus, epidemic jaundice, poisoning with various poisons, and 
experiments in which prisoners were intentional burned with the chemicals 
from English incendiary bombs.  Id. at 70–85. 
 82. Id. at 70–85. 
 83. The Medicine Case, supra note 74, at 181.   
 84. Id. 
 85. The U.S. government and the American Medical Association (AMA) 
heavily influenced the Code.  JONSEN, supra note 38, at 135.  Specifically, the 
language of the Nuremberg Code was drawn from an ethics report to the AMA 
by Dr. Andrew C. Ivy, the man later chosen by the United States to act as the 
prosecution’s medical expert during the trial.  Id. 
 86. WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ABOUT THE WMA, at http://www.wma. 
net/e/about/index.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). 
 87. WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL 
PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (1989) [here-
inafter 1989 DECLARATION]. 
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berg trials.88  The Declaration’s introduction heavily emphasized 
that the primary duty and obligation of all physicians is the 
health and welfare of patients.89  The Declaration also empha-
sizes that the only legitimate purpose of biomedical research 
involving human subjects is to “improve diagnostic, therapeutic 
and prophylactic procedures and the understanding of the aeti-
ology and pathogenesis of disease.”90  One of the most noticeable 
stylistic differences between the Code and the Declaration is the 
placement of informed consent guidelines.  Unlike the Code, the 
Declaration places informed consent in the middle of the docu-
ment rather than as the primary tenet.91  The difference reflects 
the Declaration authors’ belief that “the essence of research eth-
ics is the integrity and vigilance of the investigator.”92  
Since its adoption in 1964, the Declaration of Helsinki has 
been amended five times.93  The Declaration of Helsinki was 
substantially revised in 197594 from five to twelve basic guiding 
principals for ensuring ethical research.95  It was amended 
  
 88. John Harris, Research on Human Subjects, Exploitation, and Global 
Principles of Ethics, in 3 LAW AND MEDICINE 379, 384 (2000). 
 89. The Declaration begins by declaring that, 
[i]t is the mission of the physician to safeguard the health of the peo-
ple. His or her knowledge and conscience are dedicated to the fulfill-
ment of this mission…The Declaration of Geneva of the World Medi-
cal Assembly binds the physician with the words, “The health of my 
patient will be my first consideration,” and the International Code of 
Medical Ethics declares that, “A physician shall act only in the pa-
tient’s interest when providing medical care which might have the ef-
fect of weakening the physical and mental condition of the patient.” 
1989 DECLARATION, supra note 87. 
 90. Id.  Aetiology is defined as “the cause of a disease.”  Webster’s Online 
Dictionary, at http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org (last visited Feb. 5, 
2005).  Pathogenesis is the origin or development of a disease.  Id. 
 91. JONSEN, supra note 38, at 136. 
 92. Id.  
 93. 1989 DECLARATION, supra note 87. 
 94. Heidi P. Forster et al., The 2000 Revision of the Declaration of Helsinki: 
A Step Forward or More Confusion, 358 LANCET 1449, 1449 (2001). 
 95. Rebecca A. Finkenbinder, Comment, New Recommendations on Inter-
national Research: Can Minimum Standards Prevent the Exploitation of Vul-
nerable Human Subjects in Developing Countries?, 21 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 
363, 373 (2003). 
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again in 1983, 1989, 1996, and 2000.96  The Declaration’s 1983 
and 1989 versions are currently codified in the Code of Federal 
Regulations for the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA).97  
The 2000 revision of the Declaration includes the most substan-
tial revisions since the 1975 amendment.98  These revisions have 
been highly criticized due to the hasty passage of the new Dec-
laration and because of the controversial nature of several addi-
tions.99  Currently, the FDA has declined to include the 2000 
Declaration in its regulations and has retained the 1989 ver-
sion.100 Part V of this Note discusses specific provisions within 
the 2000 Declaration in further detail. 
c. Belmont Report 
The majority of modern bioethics guidelines have been cre-
ated by international committees; however, the guidelines for-
mulated specifically for U.S. researchers have been highly in-
fluential at the international level.  The National Research Act 
(Act) was signed into law by President Nixon in July 1974.101  
The Act was the first U.S. legislation to include medical ethics 
principles as a regulatory mechanism for controlling and sanc-
tioning behavior.102  The legislation promulgated by the Act cov-
  
 96. WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL 
PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2000) [here-
inafter 2000 DECLARATION]. 
 97. 21 C.F.R. 312.120(c)(4) (codifies 1989 Declaration for foreign clinical 
trials of new drugs); 21 C.F.R. 814.15(b) (codifies 1983 Declaration for foreign 
trials of medical devices). 
 98. Forster, supra note 94, at 1449. 
 99. Only two weeks were made available for comments on the proposed 
revisions before the assembly voted.  Id.  Some of the new additions included 
requiring disclosure of conflicts of interest, expansion of the definition of vul-
nerable populations that necessitate special protections, and a requirement 
that research participants be assured access to best proven methods of treat-
ment identified by the study.  Id. 
 100. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ACCEPTANCE OF FOREIGN CLINICAL 
STUDIES 2 (2001) [hereinafter FDA GUIDANCE REPORT], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/clinical031301.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).  
The FDA report did not explain why the revised Declaration was not imple-
mented other than to note that the agency was reviewing its regulations to 
determine whether changes were necessary.  Id. 
 101. National Research Act of 1974, Pub. Law 93-348, § 201, 88 Stat. 342 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 102. JONSEN, supra note 38, at 99. 
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ers all biomedical research performed by individual researchers 
or institutions that receive federal funding for their work.103  
Additionally, the Act created the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research (National Commission).104  One of the mandates for the 
National Commission was to “identify the ethical principles 
which should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral 
research with human subjects and develop guidelines that 
should be followed in such research.”105 
Despite the existence of internationally-accepted bioethics 
guidelines, such as the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of 
Helsinki, the National Commission determined that ethical 
guidelines of the time did not have sufficient depth.106  The Na-
tional Commission therefore commenced a series of meetings 
that culminated in the publication of the Belmont Report in 
April 1979.107  The Belmont Report contained the National 
Commission’s recommendations for ethical principles that 
should be used by researchers and institutions receiving federal 
funding.108 
The Belmont Report was designed as a general policy state-
ment that provides a basic framework for discussions on bio-
medical research ethics.109  The National Commission deter-
mined that ethical research on human subjects included three 
overriding principles:  respect for persons, beneficence and jus-
tice.110  Respect for persons incorporates protection for the 
autonomy of individuals and protections for individuals with 
  
 103. Id. 
 104. National Research Act § 201. 
 105. JONSEN, supra note 38, at 102 (quoting National Research Act of 1974). 
 106. Id.  The authors of the Belmont Report also determined that the Nur-
emberg Code and the 1975 Declaration of Helsinki were often inadequate to 
cover complex situations and at times were in conflict with one another.  
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL 
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF 
RESEARCH 3 (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT], available at http:// 
www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/04/briefing/2004-
4066b1_22_Belmont%20Report.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).   
 107. JONSEN, supra note 38, at 102. 
 108. DENNIS M. MALONEY, PROTECTION OF HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS 20 (1984). 
 109. Id. at 21. 
 110. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 106, at Basic Ethical Principles. 
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diminished autonomy.111  The regulatory structure that insures 
respect for persons is informed consent.112  Beneficence is the 
obligation placed upon researchers to “(1) do no harm and (2) 
maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms” to 
participants.113  The application of the beneficence principal is 
exemplified by thoughtful and thorough assessment of the risks 
and benefits associated with proposed research by investigators 
and IRBs/RECs.114  The final overriding principal of ethical re-
  
 111. Id.  In discussing the respect for persons, the National Commission 
defined an autonomous individual as a person “capable of deliberation about 
personal goals and of acting under the direction of such deliberation.”  Id.  
Respect for individual autonomy recognizes the rights of individuals to have 
opinions and to make their own choices, so long as there is no detriment to 
others.  Id.  Individuals with diminished autonomy are children, those who 
have been incapacitated by physical or mental illness, or those whose liberty 
is severely limited (generally, prisoners).  Id. 
 112. Id. at Applications.  The application of respect for persons was broken 
down into three necessary requirements for informed consent: information, 
comprehension and voluntariness.  Id.  “Information” requires that individu-
als are provided sufficient information to make an informed opinion and 
choices about participation in a research project.  Id.  Sufficient information 
generally includes: research procedure, purpose of the research, anticipated 
benefits and potential risks, alternative procedures or treatments available, 
and “a statement offering the subject the opportunity to ask questions and to 
withdraw at any time from the research.”  Id. 
 113. Id. at Basic Ethical Principles.  The National Commission noted that 
this principle extends to the entire enterprise of research, and thereby places 
an obligation on society at large as well as on individual researchers.  Id.  It 
was also noted that there are some inherent difficulties in implementation.  
Id.  It is difficult to avoid harm when researchers are often unaware of poten-
tial harms.  Id.  It is normal in research for there to be some risk of harm to 
participants; the difficulty for individuals and society lies in determining what 
constitutes a justifiable risk.  Id. 
 114. Id. at Applications.  Risk/Benefit assessment requires that researchers 
carefully sift through all existing, relevant data to determine potential risks 
and to evaluate alternative methods of obtaining the same benefits sought in 
the research.  Id.  Risk/benefit analysis is a means of examining the design of 
proposed research and to evaluate whether risks inherent to the research are 
justifiable.  Id.  Justifiability of research must, at minimum, reflect the follow-
ing: 
(i) Brutal or inhumane treatment of human subjects is never morally 
justified…. (ii)  Risks should be reduced to those necessary to achieve 
the research objective…. (iii)  When research involves significant risk 
of serious impairment, review committees should be extraordinarily 
insistent on the justification of the risk…. (iv)  When vulnerable 
populations are involved in research, the appropriateness of involving 
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search is justice.115  Justice revolves around the concept of equal 
distributions of burdens and benefits.116  Application of the jus-
tice principal results in the development of fair procedures and 
outcomes in the selection of research participants.117  Despite 
being written almost thirty years ago, the Belmont Report re-
tains substantial influence on U.S. research policy and later 
international ethics guides.118 
2.  Internationally-Recognized Ethics Guidelines— 
1980 to Present 
a. CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Re-
search Involving Human Subjects 
The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sci-
ences (CIOMS) is an international nongovernmental organiza-
tion founded in 1949 under the auspices of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Sci-
  
them should itself be demonstrated…. (v)  Relevant risks and benefits 
must be thoroughly arrayed in documents and procedures used in the 
informed consent process. 
Id. 
 115. Id. at Basic Ethical Principles. 
 116. Id.  The burden of research, the risks to individual participants, should 
not fall unfairly or unequally on any one group or population of people.  Id.  
Additionally, the benefits derived from research, new techniques, or drugs 
should not go unequally to financially or socially advantaged groups or popu-
lations.   Id. 
 117. Id. at Applications.  Both social and individual justice are relevant to 
the discussion of equitable selection of research participants.  Id.  Individual 
justice requires fairness and unbiased selection of participants.  Id.  Social 
justice requires awareness of those who should or should not be allowed to 
participate in research based on a person’s ability to bear burdens or on the 
appropriateness of potentially increasing the burden on an already burdened 
class of individuals.  Id. 
 118. MALONEY, supra note 108, at 20.  A direct example of this influence can 
be found in the CIOMS Guidelines, infra Part II.B.2.i.  The CIOMS Guidelines 
specifically identify the three overriding principles of the Belmont Report as 
the ethical principles that were foundational to the CIOMS Guidelines.  
COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF MEDICAL SCIENCES, 
INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING 
HUMAN SUBJECTS, at General Ethical Principles (2002) [hereinafter CIOMS 
Guidelines], available at http://www.cioms.ch/frame_guidelines_nov_2002.htm 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2005). 
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entific and Cultural and Organization (UNECO).119  CIOMS be-
gan its work on ethics in biomedical research in the late 
1970s.120  The goal of the organization was to create a set of 
guidelines that would “indicate how the ethical principles that 
should guide the conduct of biomedical research involving hu-
man subjects, as set for the in the Declaration of Helsinki, could 
be effectively applied, particularly in developing countries, 
given their socioeconomic circumstances, laws and regulations, 
and executive and administrative arrangements.”121 
Several bioethical documents regarding medical research 
have been created by CIOMS.  In 1982, CIOMS, in collaboration 
with WHO, published Proposed International Ethical Guide-
lines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (Pro-
posed Guidelines).122  Proposed Guidelines was the first docu-
ment specifically designed to help countries, developing coun-
tries in particular, effectively apply the ethical guidelines in the 
Declaration to their existing socio-political structure.123  In 1993, 
revision of the Proposed Guidelines resulted in publication of 
International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research In-
volving Human Subjects.124  Rapid changes in medical re-
search—including the increased use of controlled clinical trials 
in developing countries, funded and conducted by external 
sponsors and investigators—required that the document receive 
further amendment.125  The revised International Ethical Guide-
lines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects was 
published in 2002 (2002 Guidelines).126   
The 2002 Guidelines were heavily reviewed and influenced by 
the international community.  Extensive opportunities for input 
by members of the international bioethics debate were provided 
over the four years, from 1998 to 2002, during which the revised 
  
 119. CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 118, at Background. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id.  Proposed Guidelines was created prior to the outbreak of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic and the subsequent large-scale research trials that were 
required to deal with HIV/AIDS.  Id.  It was specifically targeted toward pro-
tection of research participants in developing nations who were involved in 
traditional small-scale, publicly-funded research protocols.  Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  See infra Part I. 
 126. CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 118, at Background. 
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guidelines were produced.127  The final redrafting committee in-
cluded experts in ethics and research from every continent.128  
The 2002 Guidelines, like the Belmont Report in the United 
States, emphasize three overarching ethical principles:  respect 
for persons, 129 beneficence, 130 and justice.131  Unlike the Declara-
tion of Helsinki, which includes broad, generalized principles, 
the 2002 Guidelines include extensive commentary designed to 
highlight the specific issues that have been discussed in acade-
mia regarding each guideline.    
The 2002 Guidelines include twenty-one ethics guidelines for 
biomedical research at the international level.132  Unlike the 
primacy of informed consent in the Code, the primary tenet of 
the 2002 Guidelines aligns the guidelines with the Declaration 
by requiring a showing of ethical and scientific justification for 
all research.133  Guidelines on informed consent are numerous 
and detailed, but do not begin until Guideline 4.134  Guidelines 2 
and 3 relate to ethical review of research and will be discussed 
in further detail in Part V of this Note.  The 2002 Guidelines 
  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Respect for persons includes respect for individual autonomy in making 
personal choices, as well as protection of persons with impaired or diminished 
autonomy.  Id. at General Ethical Principles.  
 130. Beneficence is the “ethical obligation to maximize benefits and to 
minimize harms.”  Id. 
 131. Justice primarily refers of “distributive justice,” which requires equita-
ble distribution of burdens and benefits.  Id. 
 132. Id. at Guidelines. 
 133. Id.  Guideline 1 specifies: 
The ethical justification of biomedical research involving human sub-
jects is the prospect of discovering new ways of benefiting people’s 
[sic] health.  Such research can be ethically justifiable only if it is car-
ried out in ways that respect and protect, and are fair to, the subjects 
of that research and are morally acceptable within the communities 
in which the research is carried out.  Moreover, because scientifically 
invalid research is unethical in that it exposes research subjects to 
risk without possible benefit, investigators and sponsors must ensure 
that proposed studies involving human subjects conform to generally 
accepted scientific principles and are based on adequate knowledge of 
the pertinent scientific literature. 
Id. 
 134. Id.  Informed consent is at issue in Guidelines 4–6; consent issues with 
those unable to give full, informed consent are covered in Guidelines 9, 14 
(children), and 15 (mental/behavioral disorders).  Id. 
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also include specific provisions for dealing with vulnerable 
populations135 and a controversial “choice of control” guideline.136  
The specific focus of the 2002 Guidelines on medical research 
conducted at the international level makes this document par-
ticularly valuable to investigators, sponsors, and host countries 
wishing to ensure the ethical soundness of their research pro-
grams. 
b.  International Conference on Harmonization’s Good Clinical 
Practices 
The substantial increase in regulations and guidelines di-
rected at clinical research during the 1960s and 1970s coincided 
with expansion of the pharmaceutical industry into the global 
marketplace.137  Despite common regulatory goals of assuring 
quality, safety and efficacy of new drugs, the specific technical 
  
 135. Id.  Vulnerable populations generally include prisoners, minorities, the 
mentally ill, the hopelessly ill, poor people and children.  ADIL E. SHAMOO & 
DAVID B. RESNIK, RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH 184 (2003). 
 136. Id. at Guidelines.   “Choice of control” generally refers to the type of 
treatment that a member of the control group in an experiment will receive.  
See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, The Globalization of Health Law: The Case of Per-
missibility of Placebo-based Research, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 175 (2000).  Consid-
erable debate in bioethical circles is currently focused on the use of placebo-
control studies.  Id.  A placebo is generally an inert substance given to a re-
search participant in lieu of the treatment being received by the non-control 
group.  Id. at 176.  The debate around the use of placebo-control studies is 
particularly vociferous in research experiments that test drugs or procedures 
responsive to harms that already have alternative methods of treatment.  Id. 
at 177.  The question oft being: is it ethical to deny a known, proven treatment 
to any participant, even if that treatment would be unavailable to the partici-
pant outside of the research experiment?  See, e.g., Finkenbinder, supra note 
95. 
 137. See ICH GLOBAL COOPERATION GROUP, INFORMATION BROCHURE 3–4 
(2001) [hereinafter ICH INFORMATION BROCHURE], available at http:// 
www.ich.org/MediaServer.jser?@_ID=410&@_MODE=GLB (last visited Jan. 
31, 2005).  In its 2004 annual report, PhRMA, the largest U.S. association of 
pharmaceutical companies involved in research and development, stated that 
its members’ research and development expenditures abroad increased by fifty 
times in the last thirty years.  PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND 
MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2004, at 39 
(2004) [hereinafter PhRMA 2004 PROFILE], available at http://www.phrma.org/ 
publications/publications//2004-03-31.937.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).  
Additionally, the increase in research and development spending abroad out-
paced domestic spending by more than 1000% over the same period.  Id. 
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requirements that a drug needed to meet prior to approval for 
sale to the public varied substantially between countries.138  As a 
result, the pharmaceutical industry was required to repeat 
time-consuming and expensive clinical trials139 in each country 
in which they wanted to sell their drugs.140  As a response to the 
growing globalization of the pharmaceutical industry and the 
regulatory burdens that new drugs faced when introduced to 
various countries’ markets, many began to call for international 
harmonization of regulatory requirements.141   
The International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Hu-
man Use (ICH) was established in 1990.142  The ICH is a joint 
initiative by regulators and industry in the three nations that 
  
 138. ICH INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 137, at 4. 
 139. For example, in the United States, a new drug compound generally 
takes over ten years to proceed from the preclinical stage to approval for mar-
keting at a cost of approximately $800 million.  See, e.g., No New Drugs, WALL 
ST. J., July 21, 2003, at A10; PhRMA 2004 PROFILE, supra note 137, at 2 (av-
erage new drug takes ten to fifteen years to get to market and costs approxi-
mately $800 million to develop). 
 140. ICH INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 137, at 4.  Repetition of clini-
cal trials was burdening pharmaceutical companies’ research & development 
budgets, impacting the overall cost of health care, and creating substantial 
delay in bringing safe and efficacious new treatments to patients.  Id. 
 141. Official Website for the International Conference on Harmonization, 
History and Future of ICH, at http://www.ich.org/UrlGrpServer.jser?@_ID= 
276&@_TEMPLATE=254 (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).  Initial harmonization of 
regulatory requirements was done by the European Community (now the 
European Union) in the 1980s.  ICH INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 137, 
at 4.  See also David Vogel, The Globalization of Pharmaceutical Regulation, 
11 GOVERNANCE 1, 3–5 (1998).  The desire to harmonize was expressed in dip-
lomatic discussions between Europe, Japan and the United States during the 
same period.  ICH INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 137, at 4.  However, 
specific plans for action were not initiated until the 1989 WHO Conference on 
Drug Regulatory Authorities in Paris.  Id.  The planning at the WHO confer-
ence led to discussions between the authorities and the International Federa-
tion of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA), which later 
hosted the first ICH meeting.  Id. 
 142. ICH Steering Committee, Statement by the ICH Steering Committee 
on the Occasion of the Fourth International Conference on Harmonization 
(July 16–18, 1997), available at http://www.ich.org/MediaServer.jser?@_ID=3 
48&@_MODE=GLB.  A similar harmonization organization has been formed 
for the medical device sector, called the Global Harmonization Task Force, but 
this project is less formalized and is in an earlier stage of development than 
the ICH.  D. B. Jefferys, The Regulation of Medical Devices and the Role of the 
Medical Devices Agency, 52 BRIT. J. CLIN. PHARMACOLOGY 229, 233–34 (2001). 
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dominate the development of new pharmaceutical products:  the 
United States, Japan and the European Union.143  The primary 
objective of the ICH is to:  
[I]ncrease international harmonization of technical require-
ments to ensure that safe, effective and high quality medicines 
are developed and registered in the most efficient and cost-
effective manner … [in order to] promote public health, pre-
vent unnecessary duplication of clinical trials in humans, and 
minimize the use of animal testing without compromising 
safety and effectiveness.144 
To further this objective, harmonization projects have focused 
on four categories: Safety,145 Quality,146 Efficacy,147 and a Multid-
isciplinary category for topics that do not fit nicely in the other 
categories.148  One of the most widely-recognized products of the 
ICH, published in 1996, is the ICH Good Clinical Practices 
guidelines (GCP) for conducting clinical research.149  
Unlike the previous guidelines, the ICH GCP is not focused 
solely upon ethical considerations in clinical research.  Rather, 
the GCP is a technical document that includes guidance on the 
  
 143. ICH INFORMATION BROCHURE, supra note 137, at 6.  The ICH has six 
official parties, as well as observers whose participation is intended to act as a 
link to non-ICH nations.  Id.  The regulatory agencies involved in the ICH 
include the European Commission (European Union), the Ministry of Health, 
Labor and Welfare (Japan) and the FDA (United States).  Id. at 6–7.  Industry 
representation is provided by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Industries and Associations, Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion, and PhRMA.  Id. at 6–8.  The observers to the ICH are Canada (repre-
sented by Health Canada), the European Free Trade Area (represented by 
Swissmedic Switzerland) and the World Health Organization.  Id. at 8.  Addi-
tionally, the ICH Secretariat is run by the IFPMA.  Id.  The IFPMA repre-
sents prescription drug manufacturers and the research-based pharmaceuti-
cal industry in fifty-six countries.  Official Website for the International Con-
ference on Harmonization, Structure of the ICH, at http://www.ich.org/UrlGrp 
Server.jser?@_ID=276&@_TEMPLATE=254 (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). 
 144. ICH GLOBAL COOPERATION GROUP, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT ICH 5 
(2000), available at http://www.ich.org/MediaServer.jser?@_ID=406&@_MODE 
=GLB (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). 
 145. Safety topics are concerned with conduct and practice in pre-clinical 
research studies.  Id. at 7. 
 146. Quality topics relate to chemistry, product controls and product manu-
facturing.  Id. 
 147. Efficacy topics cover the conduct and reporting of clinical trials.  Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See generally ICH GCP, supra note 30. 
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development of a research protocol, scientific considerations and 
documentary requirements, as well as ethical considerations in 
the testing of new pharmaceutical products.150  Though the ICH 
focuses upon issues pertaining to pharmaceutical products, the 
GCP can be applied to all clinical investigations that use human 
subjects.151  The GCP provides thirteen principles intended to 
ensure the safety of participants and production of accurate 
data from clinical trials.152  The first GCP principle states that 
“[c]linical trials should be conducted in accordance with the 
ethical principles that have their origin in the Declaration of 
Helsinki, and that are consistent with the GCP and the appli-
cable regulatory requirement(s).”153  In particular, ethical review 
by an independent review committee154 and informed consent by 
participants are emphasized.155  The influence of the ICH GCP 
on regulations affecting clinical trials has been substantial in 
many nations, including the three ICH countries and many 
non-ICH countries.156  As such, an ever-increasing number of 
clinical trials are being conducted under the guidance of the 
GCP.157   
  
 150. See id. at 1 (“GCP is an international ethical and scientific quality 
standard for designing, conducting, recording, and reporting trials that in-
volve the participation of human subjects.”). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 8–9. 
 153. Id. at 8.  There is no mention in the GCP of the version of the Declara-
tion of Helsinki referred to in the Principles section; however, the publication 
date of the GCP, 1996, suggests that the GCP was influenced by the 1989 
version of the Declaration. 
 154. The GCP, like the Declaration of Helsinki, states that all clinical trials 
must be supervised by an Institutional Review Board or and Independent 
Ethics Committee.  Id. at 9.  The specific requirements for review are very 
similar to the regulatory requirements of the Common Rule and the FDA.  See 
id. at 10–13; infra Part III. A. 1. & 2.  See also GLOBALIZATION OF CLINICAL 
TRIALS, supra note 34, at 3 (“[ICH GCP] guidelines are very similar to FDA 
regulations.”). 
 155. ICH GCP, supra note 30, at 17–21. 
 156. See, e.g., GLOBALIZATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 34, at 5 
(“[M]any countries have adopted the Good Clinical Practice guidelines from 
the International Conference on Harmonization as their regulatory stan-
dard.”); Ministry of Health, Malaysian Guidelines for Good Clinical Practices 
iii (1999) (Malaysia’s Ministry of Health adopted the basic principles of the 
ICH GCP, with some minor modifications for local requirements), available at 
http://www.vadscorner.com/Malaysian_gcp.PDF (last visited Feb. 1, 2005). 
 157. GLOBALIZATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 34, at 3. 
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III. ETHICAL REVIEW OF PROPOSED HUMAN-SUBJECT RESEARCH 
As one can see from the previous section, there is no shortage 
of ethical guides for researchers to choose from when conduct-
ing clinical trials.  Yet, who is responsible for ensuring that 
ethical guidelines are followed?  The answer to this question is 
not as simple or straightforward as many researchers, sponsors, 
and participants would hope.  Rather, responsibility for ensur-
ing ethical behavior in research projects varies depending on 
several variables, including:  who has initiated the research 
project,158 how the project is funded,159 and the location where 
the research is going to take place.160 
Society’s extensive use of research places duties of public re-
sponsibility and accountability on researchers.161  In designing a 
protocol, the individual researcher has initial responsibility for 
assuring that the project will be ethical.162  The next step in the 
  
 158. See discussion infra Parts III.A.–B.  Research initiated by a U.S. 
pharmaceutical company will be guided by FDA regulations if the product is 
going to be marketed to the public.  See infra Part III.A.2.  Therefore, an IRB 
would be responsible for assuring ethical guidelines were followed.  Id.  How-
ever, if a research protocol was initiated by an individual researcher in the 
United States, who was not affiliated with a research institution, then U.S. 
regulations would not apply and the individual researcher would be the only 
entity responsible for assuring ethical conduct.  See discussion infra Part 
III.A. 
 159. Projects funded in full or in part by the U.S. government are regulated 
by the Department of Health and Human Services, which requires research 
institutions to give assurances and ensure review by IRBs.  See infra Part 
III.A.1.  Projects funded entirely by private entities are not regulated unless 
the product will fall under FDA regulations.  Id. at Part III.A.1.–2.  Therefore, 
it would be up to the private sponsor to assure ethical behavior. 
 160. Most research projects in the United States are reviewed by IRBs, who 
ensure that ethical guidelines are followed.  See infra Part III.A.  However, if 
the project is conducted outside the United States, there is considerable varia-
tion in regulation of research and the identity of entities responsible for ethi-
cal conduct during clinical trials.  See infra Part III.B. 
 161. Improper research has the potential to kill or harm participants during 
clinical trials as well as patients whose doctors use erroneous results in 
treatment; money or valuable resources can be wasted and improper or un-
reasonable laws and policies can result from unreliable or erroneous research 
results.  SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 6.  See also discussion of Dr. 
Bezwoda, infra Part I.   
 162. Standards of conduct binding all researchers emphasize honesty, integ-
rity, trust, accountability, respect, confidentiality and fairness.  SHAMOO & 
RESNIK, supra note 135, at 6.  Adherence to these ethical tenets is useful in 
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chain of responsibility usually lies with a group of individuals 
who have volunteered to review other researchers’ projects.  
These groups, called Research Ethics Committees (REC),163 are 
often mandated by law.164  RECs are generally responsible for 
reviewing and approving all proposed research involving human 
subjects prior to the initiation of any clinical trials.165  
The primary purpose of RECs is to safeguard the rights and 
welfare of human research subjects.166  Prior to RECs, the re-
sponsibility of balancing “society’s interests in protecting the 
rights of subjects [with] developing knowledge that can benefit 
the subjects or society as a whole” fell solely to the researcher 
conducting an experiment.167  RECs allow individuals independ-
ent of a research project to evaluate scientific and ethical valid-
ity.168  Their main function is to determine whether research 
adequately addresses six general ethical norms:  (1) good re-
search design; (2) competent research investigators; (3) positive 
balance between potential harms and benefits; (4) informed 
consent; (5) equitable selection of research participants; (6) pol-
icy for dealing with research-related injuries.169  Each country or 
institution differs on other specific qualities of RECs, such as 
membership and types of research reviewed.170 
A.   Research Ethics Committees in the United States 
In the United States, ethical and scientific review of research 
proposals is conducted by a committee, called an Institutional 
Review Board, which is generally located at the site where the 
  
promoting the goals of research as well as effective collaboration between 
investigators.  Id.   
 163. REC is a general term to describe these review committees; however, in 
Parts III.A–B., the descriptor “REC” will be reserved for review committees 
outside of the United States. 
 164. See infra Parts III.A.–B. 
 165. See generally NBAC INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 16. 
 166. ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 326 
(1988). 
 167. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH SERVICES BY DHEW 1–2 
(1978). 
 168. Id. 
 169. LEVINE, supra note 166, at 19, 326. 
 170. See infra Part III.B. 
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research is to be conducted.  IRBs were originally established by 
the National Research Act of 1974171 as a response to several 
well-publicized cases of unethical medical interventions, includ-
ing reports of research abuses at medical schools and hospi-
tals.172  There are approximately three to five thousand IRBs 
located in the United States.173  IRBs are associated with hospi-
tals, academic centers, managed care organizations, federal and 
state government agencies, and for-profit companies such as 
pharmaceutical companies and medical device manufacturers.174 
1.   U.S. Regulation—The Common Rule 
The basic outline of IRBs is defined by U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) Federal Policy for the Pro-
tection of Human Subjects,175 also known as the “Common 
Rule.”176  The Common Rule applies to all human-subject re-
search conducted by researchers or institutions that have re-
ceived funds from DHHS.177  The Common Rule has three major 
components:  assurances,178 provisions on informed consent,179 
  
 171. National Research Act, Pub. Law 93-348, § 474, 88 Stat. 342 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  This is the same Act that es-
tablished the National Commission that wrote the Belmont Report.  See infra 
Part II.B.1.c. 
 172. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DHHS, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS:  
PROMISING APPROACHES 3 (1998) (“[C]oncerns grew from stories of the abuse of 
subjects during the World War II trials at Nuremberg, the promotional distri-
bution of thalidomide resulting in numerous children born with birth defects, 
the administration of cancer cells to chronically ill and senile patients at a 
hospital in New York, and others….”). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R § 46 (2000). 
 176. Jennifer A. Henderson & John J. Smith, Financial Conflict of Interest 
in Medical Research: Overview and Analysis of Federal and State Controls, 57 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 445, 447 (2002) [hereinafter Henderson & Smith, Federal & 
State Controls].   
 177. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101.  The Common Rule also applies to research con-
ducted outside the United States by researchers or institutions receiving 
DHHS funding.  Id.  
 178. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103.  An “assurance” is documentation stating that an 
institution will comply with all DHHS regulations.  Id.  The assurance must 
include the ethical principles/code that the institution will use to evaluate 
research, the designation of one or more IRBs, identification of IRB members, 
and IRB procedures for initial and continuing review of research (including 
adverse events).  Id. 
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and IRBs.180  IRBs are required to have at least five members of 
varying professional backgrounds.181  At least one member must 
come from a non-scientific profession, such as a lawyer, ethicist, 
or theologian.182  Also, at least one member must have no direct 
affiliation with the institution at which the proposed research 
project will be completed.183  Members are required to recuse 
themselves from the evaluation of any research in which they 
have a conflict of interest.184  IRBs have the authority to “ap-
prove, require modifications in (to secure approval), or disap-
prove” research proposals.185   
The Common Rule requires IRBs to evaluate proposed re-
search based on criteria that directly relate to the provisions of 
the Belmont Report.186  The Common Rule provides several cri-
teria for approval of research proposals: (1) risks to participants 
are reasonably minimized; (2) risks are reasonable in relation to 
the expected benefits to the participant; (3) selection of partici-
pants will be equitable; (4) informed consent will be sought and 
documented from each participant; (5) provisions for data moni-
toring and protection of participants’ privacy.187  Research pro-
posals must demonstrate beneficence by demonstrating that 
risks to participants have been minimized.188  Justice assess-
ments require researchers to show that selection of participants 
  
 179. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116–117. 
 180. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.107–115. 
 181. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a).  Additionally, “no IRB may consist entirely of 
men or women, or entirely of members of one profession.”  45 C.F.R. § 
46.107(b).   
 182. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(c).  Other individuals may be invited to participate 
in the review process if the group determines that their professional expertise 
would be helpful in the evaluation process, however these individuals have no 
voting rights in the approval process.  45 C.F.R. § 46.107(f).   
 183. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(d).   
 184. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(e).   
 185. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a).  An IRB should require documentation on in-
formed consent or may waive consent in specific circumstances. 45 C.F.R. § 
46.109(c).  IRBs may require specific information to be added to consent forms 
in order to increase participant protection.  45 C.F.R. § 46.109(b).     
 186. See 45 C.F.R § 46.111.  The overriding principles of the Belmont Re-
port—respect for persons, beneficence, and justice—are discussed infra Part 
II.B.1. 
 187. 45 C.F.R. § 47.111(a).   
 188. See id. 
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will be fair and equitable.189  Respect for persons is applicable to 
informed consent requirements.190   
2.   U.S. Regulation—Food & Drug Administration 
In order to sell a new drug or medical device in the U.S. mar-
ket, a manufacturer must first obtain approval for the product 
from the FDA.191  Any product manufacturer that applies for 
FDA approval must have its product tested in pre-clinical trials 
and have designed a research protocol, approved by an IRB, for 
testing the product in human subjects.192  As a component of 
mandatory human-subject clinical trials, the FDA has its own 
regulations governing IRBs.193  Though the scope of the FDA’s 
regulatory impact extends to commercial, as well as federally-
funded research projects, the main components of the Common 
Rule discussed above are mirrored in FDA regulations.194   
B.   Research Ethics Committees in Other Countries 
In other nations, the responsibility for conducting ethical and 
scientific review of research proposals is held by various enti-
ties.  A country’s Ministry of Health may be the primary re-
viewer of proposed research.195  Some nations have national eth-
ics boards, state or regional boards, or localized institutional 
review committees similar to those found in the United 
States.196  Often there is a combination of review mechanisms, 
such as review by multiple institutional RECs or review by a 
  
 189. See id. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See, e.g., PETER B. HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 
513 (1991).   
 192. See id.  There are some exceptions to the rule that a research project 
and application for FDA approval should happen simultaneously, such as 
when a manufacturer has data already available from a foreign clinical study.  
See infra Part V.B. 
 193. Institutional Review Board, 21 C.F.R. § 56. 
 194. MALONEY, supra note 108, at 59.  See also Good Clinical Practice Pro-
gram, Comparison of FDA and HHS Human Subject Protection Regulations, 
FDA Official website, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/gcp/comparison.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 16, 2005). 
 195. Nancy Kass & Adnan A. Hyder, Attitudes and Experiences of U.S. and 
Developing Country Investigators Regarding U.S. Human Subject Regulations, 
in 2 NBAC INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH, supra note 29, at B-49.  
 196. Id. 
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national review board and an institutional REC.197  Some devel-
oping nations do not have regulations pertaining to human-
subject research, and therefore responsibility for ethical review 
may lie with researchers or foreign sponsors.198   
Different countries’ ethical review procedures are helpful to 
understand the similarities and differences that exist between 
the United States and other nations.   In 2001, the European 
Union (EU) adopted Directive 2001/20/EC (Directive),199 mod-
eled upon the ICH GCP and applicable to all member states, 
which directs harmonization in the EU of the technical re-
quirements for the development of medicinal products.200  Ac-
cording to the Directive, all member states are required to have 
RECs that have the same purpose and functions as U.S. IRBs.201  
RECs, similar to U.S. IRBs, are also mandated in Japan, Can-
ada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.202  In 
Central America, Costa Rica utilizes institutional review com-
mittees followed by review through the Ministry of Health.203  A 
similar system of review exists in India.204  Several Asian coun-
  
 197. See e.g., Hirtle, supra note 30, at 265–66. 
 198. See Kass & Hyder, supra note 195, at B-8. 
 199. Council Directive 2001/20/EC, 1990 O.J. (L 121) 34 (directing Member 
states in the implementation of good clinical practice in human-subject clini-
cal trials). 
 200. See id. art. 1(2) (“Good clinical practice is a set of internationally rec-
ognized ethical and scientific quality requirements which must be observed for 
designing, conducting, recording or reporting clinical trials that involve the 
participation of human subjects.”). 
 201. See id. art. 6, 9(1).  See also MEDICINES AND HEALTHCARE PRODUCTS 
REGULATORY AGENCY, DESCRIPTION OF THE MEDICINES FOR HUMAN USE 
(CLINICAL TRIALS) REGULATIONS 2004, at 8–9, available at http://med 
icines.mhra.gov.uk/ourwork/licensingmeds/types/ctdregs_shortdesc.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2005). 
 202. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINES FOR GOOD CLINICAL 
PRACTICE (GCP) FOR TRIALS ON PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 5 (1995), available 
at http://www.who.int/medicines/library/par/ggcp/GCPGuidePharmatrials.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2005); Health Canada Official Website, Good Clinical 
Practice: Consolidated Guidelines, at http://www.ncehr-cnerh.org/english/gcp 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2005). 
 203. Jaime Daremblum, Editorials: Drug Trials in the Third World, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 5, 2001, at A20 (Mr. Daremblum is the Costa Rican Ambassador to 
the United States). 
 204. See, e.g., C.M. Gulhati, Needed: Closer Scrutiny of Clinical Trials, 12 
IND. J. MED. ETHICS 4 (2004) (research protocols are reviewed by a hospital 
ethics committee and the Drugs Controller General, India (equivalent to Min-
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tries have adopted REC regulations that are almost identical to 
the Common Rule; however, these RECs generally limit their 
review to research on pharmaceutical products.205  In the vast 
majority of developing countries, RECs are non-existent or are 
mirrors of U.S. IRBs and rely heavily on U.S. regulations for 
procedural and substantive guidance.206 
  
istry of Health review)), available at http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/ 
121ed004.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005); Krishan Maggon, Regulatory Re-
form and GCP Clinical Trials with New Drugs in India, 1 CLIN. TRIALS 461, 
462–63 (2004) (reviewing existing regulation of clinical trials and new reforms 
to allow trials following principles of the ICH GCP). 
 205. See, e.g., Ock-Joo Kim et al., Current Status of the Institutional Review 
Boards in Korea: Constitution, Operation, and Policy for Protection of Human 
Research Participants, 18 J. KOREAN MED. SCI. 3, 4 (2003).  South Korean 
regulations are modeled upon the REC requirements outlined in the ICH 
GCP.  Id.  As noted in the discussion of the ICH GCP, infra Part II.B.2.ii., the 
guidelines for independent ethical review committees are almost identical to 
U.S. regulations.  South Korea’s regulations have only been fully in place 
since 2001, and therefore many Korean IRBs are still struggling with imple-
mentation.  Kim, supra, at 4.  Korean researchers and institutions have al-
ready complained of many of the issues that are prevalent with U.S. IRBs, 
including inconsistent regulation at the institutional level and insufficient 
national guidance on the actual functioning of RECs.  Id.  Since Korean IRBs 
have limited their review efforts to drug trials, other forms of human-subject 
research receive no review at all.  Id.  Singapore’s IRBs are regulated by the 
“Singapore Guideline for Good Clinical Practice,” which is based upon the ICH 
GCP.  BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMITTEE (SING.), RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN 
SUBJECTS: GUIDELINES FOR IRBS 1 (2004) [hereinafter SING. IRB GUIDELINES], 
available at http://www.bioethics-singapore.org/resources/reports3.html (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2005).  In the last decade, Singapore has taken significant 
strides toward becoming a world-leader in biomedical research.  Is S’pore’s 
Zeal Sending Wrong Signal?, BUS. TIMES (Sing.), Apr. 8, 2003, available at 
2003 WL 2352450.  Singapore has extensive regulations pertaining to phar-
maceutical clinical trials.  SING. IRB GUIDELINES, supra, at 12.  However, it 
has not developed regulations for human-subject clinical trials that do not 
involve the testing of new drugs.  Id.  Non-pharmaceutical research may re-
ceive ethical review if conducted in certain hospitals, as Singapore’s Ministry 
of Health requires all government and restructured hospitals to have hospital 
ethics committees to review all types of human-subject research protocols 
conducted within the institution.  Id. at 13.  See also MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
SINGAPORE, NATIONAL MEDICAL ETHICS COMMITTEE: A REVIEW OF ACTIVITIES, 
1994–1997 (1998); Andy Ho, Medical Research—Who Watches Ethics Panels?, 
STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Apr. 16, 2003 (inspired by revelations that a prominent 
researcher, the head of the National Neuroscience Institute, had violated re-
search ethics by failing to get IRB approval of his study and failing to obtain 
informed consent from research subjects), available at 2003 WL 16359464. 
 206. Kass & Hyder, supra note 195, at B-8. 
File: Cinead's MACRO 03.30.05.doc Created on: 3/30/2005 2:54 PM Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:19 PM 
2005] CONFLICTING INTERESTS & LAWS 793 
Though the form of review may vary, consistent throughout 
the world is the fundamental purpose of RECs.  They are the 
gatekeepers of research, charged with ensuring that clinical 
trials are scientifically and ethically valid.   Research Ethics 
Committees and Institutional Review Boards are the protectors 
of the people, they are the entity primarily charged with assur-
ing participant’s health and well-being will be protected.  Yet, 
RECs and IRBs are often asked to make their determinations 
without information that may be crucial to the validity of the 
research, as well as participants’ safety.  They are asked to 
make their determinations without knowing whether an inves-
tigator has a financial interest in the research she is conduct-
ing, an interest that may interfere with her obligations to par-
ticipants. 
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
A researcher’s scientific and academic credentials are a com-
mon piece of information provided to RECs and IRBs evaluating 
a new research protocol.207  Yet, are scientific and academic cre-
dentials sufficient information to evaluate researchers’ ability 
and willingness to abide by ethical guidelines?  What if a re-
searcher has been influenced by private interests that may im-
pact the project and put participants’ safety and well-being at 
risk?  Interests of a personal, financial, political, or other nature 
may conflict with professional, ethical, or legal obligations and 
duties.208  Conflicts of interest (COIs) arise when a conflict oc-
curs between interests and duties.209  The first step in under-
standing the issues surrounding COIs is to properly define the 
phrase “conflict of interest.”210  An individual is described as 
having a conflict of interest when “he or she has personal, fi-
nancial, or political interests that undermine his or her ability 
to meet or fulfill his or her primary professional, ethical, or le-
gal obligations.”211  A medical researcher working with human 
  
 207. See,e.g., ICH GCP, supra note 30, at 10 (§ 3.1.2 requires IRBs to obtain 
investigators’ current curriculum vitae or other documentation evidencing 
qualifications). 
 208. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 139. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 140. 
 211. Id. at 141, 145.  This definition is limited to those conflicts which affect 
individuals, rather than organizations or institutions.  Id.  
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subjects has a COI when she has any interests that undermine 
her duty to the health and safety of research subjects.212  An 
“apparent COI” is described as a situation in which there is no 
actual interference with a researcher’s obligations, but the re-
searcher holds some private interest that suggests that she 
could have a conflict.213  The two primary concerns with COIs 
are that conflicts will:  (1) interfere with an individual re-
searcher’s judgment or reasoning214 and/or; (2) unduly influence 
a researcher’s motivation and behavior during the experi-
ment.215 
Individual researchers are not the sole entities that may have 
interests that conflict.  Institutions that conduct research also 
have conflicts of interest.216  Institutions, including research in-
stitutions, government agencies, professional associations, and 
peer review journals often have collective duties to profession-
als, clients, students, patients, and the public.217  An institu-
tion’s primary mission, be it research, education or public ser-
vice, may be adversely affected by financial, political or other 
interests.218  Conflicts of interest at the institutional level occur 
throughout the various components of an institutions’ manage-
ment structure.219  Institutional COIs and apparent COIs are a 
prominent discussion topic in academia due to the close collabo-
  
 212. See e.g., Daryl Pullman, Conflicting Interests, Social Justice and Proxy 
Consent to Research, 27 J. MED. & PHIL. 523 (2002). 
 213. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 142. 
 214. Id. at 140.  Interference with judgment or reasoning can result in an 
individual forming a particular bias.  The individual researcher’s judgment is 
thereby skewed in a particular pattern or direction attributable to the conflict-
ing interest.  Id. at 141. 
 215. Id. at 141.  Motivational and behavioral effects of conflicts of interest 
are distinct from circumstances in which an individual’s judgment is impaired 
by the conflicting interests.  Id.  In these situations, the individual acts 
against his or her duties because of the temptation to advance the conflicting 
interest to his or her personal advantage.  Id. 
 216. See, e.g., Robert Gatter, Human Subject Research and Conflicts of In-
terest: Walking the Talk of Trust in Human Subject Research: The Challenge 
of Regulating Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EMORY L. J. 327, 344 (2003). 
 217. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 145. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id.  Institutional COIs are created by the actions or behaviors of the 
institution, as well as by the judgment, decisions, and actions of the institu-
tion’s members—i.e., faculty, committees, advisory boards, deans, presidents 
and vice presidents.  Id. 
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ration between private industry and research institutions.220  
Conflicts of interest can affect virtually any area of research; 
however, peer review (including IRBs) and clinical trials are 
particularly susceptible to conflicts.221 
A.   Intrinsic Conflicts of Interest 
Some interests that conflict with an individual’s primary duty 
to protect participants are intrinsic.222  Intrinsic conflicts are 
ubiquitous in clinical research.223  These interests form the pri-
mary motivation for conducting a research experiment in a va-
riety of instances.224  Intrinsic COIs are the self-interests of a 
researcher beyond the goals of advancing scientific knowledge 
or helping patients.  The most common intrinsic COIs involve a 
researcher’s desire for career advancement,225 publication in 
prestigious journals226 or to pioneer a successful technique.227   
Certain intrinsic COIs are financial, though separate from 
types of individual financial gain that constitute financial COIs 
  
 220. Id. at 172.  See, e.g., Jennifer A. Henderson & John J. Smith, Financial 
Conflict of Interest in Medical Research:  Overview and Analysis of Institu-
tional Controls, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 251, 251 (2003) [hereinafter Henderson 
& Smith, Institutional Controls]. 
 221. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 142. 
 222. Sharmon Sollitto et al., Intrinsic Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Re-
search: A Need for Disclosure, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 83, 85 (2003). 
 223. Id.  See also Norman G. Levinsky, Nonfinancial Conflicts of Interest in 
Research, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 759, 760 (2002). 
 224. Levinsky, supra note 223, at 760–61.  The author points out that many 
of the self-interests that are defined as intrinsic COIs have been and will con-
tinue to be a legitimate part of research.  Id.   
 225. The more research an investigator successfully completes and has had 
accepted by her peers, the greater the investigator’s reputation and ability to 
direct her career as she wishes.  See, e.g., Sollitto, supra note 222, at 85. 
 226. Id. (“The quality, placement, and number of the researcher’s publica-
tions will affect national reputation and eligibility for academic advance-
ment.”).   
 227. Id.  Other intrinsic COIs include “satisfaction of vindicating intellec-
tual biases,” the desire to win research prizes or for recognition and respect 
from peers, and certain types of financial incentives (other than those bring 
monetary benefit directly to the individual researcher).  Id. at 85–86.  The 
events surrounding HDC and Dr. Bezwoda are a perfect example of how this 
type of intrinsic conflict of interest may endanger participants’ safety.  See 
infra Part I. 
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(discussed infra).228  The current funding scheme for medical 
research promotes intrinsic financial COIs, whether research is 
privately or publicly funded.229  Continued funding of privately-
sponsored research depends, in part, on researchers’ and re-
search institutions’ ability to accrue and retain participants.230  
Publicly-sponsored research through government funding is 
also influenced by accrual and retention of participants.  Re-
newal of existing government grants and the amount of funds 
allocated for a particular research project depends upon the 
ability to continue the research, by retaining previous partici-
pants, as well as enrollment of new participants.231  These in-
trinsic financial incentives motivate researchers and institu-
tions to enroll as many participants as possible for research pro-
jects, including some that may not be entirely appropriate for 
the study, thereby creating a potential conflict with patient 
safety concerns.232  Despite their ubiquitous nature, intrinsic 
COIs have received little attention in academic discussions on 
medical ethics.233  However, intrinsic COIs are as much a threat 
to patient safety as the financial COIs that have received sub-
stantial academic, media and regulatory attention.234 
  
 228. Sollitto, supra note 222, at 86.  Intrinsic financial interests generally 
are broader than individual financial interests as they involve issues of fund-
ing for current and future research—research that will in turn further reputa-
tion and publication.  Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  Industry-sponsored research generally includes a contractually 
negotiated payment to investigators based upon the number of participants 
she signs up and who thereafter complete the treatment being researched.  Id.  
These payments are intended to cover the investigator’s research costs.  See, 
e.g., Karine Morin et al., Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of 
Clinical Trials, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 78, 78–79 (2002).  Therefore, these 
funds generally pay the researcher’s and other research personnel’s salaries 
and for facility overhead costs.  Sollitto, supra note 222, at 86. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id.  A discussion of the risk to patients due to intrinsic COIs is included 
supra note 234. 
 233. See, e.g., Levinsky, supra note 223. 
 234. Id.  While much discussion of financial COIs followed revelation that a 
researcher and his research institution had significant financial COIs after a 
patient’s death in 1999, intrinsic COIs were not part of the discourse following 
several other well-publicized deaths of healthy research participants where 
financial COIs did not exist.  Id.  However, it has been suggested that intrin-
sic COIs were influential in research that resulted in several deaths at lead-
ing research institutions.  See Sollitto, supra note 222, at 86.  A poignant ex-
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B.   Financial Conflicts of Interest 
Financial COIs are a major issue discussed in reviews of the 
current medical research environment.235  Research–industry 
collaborations often create concerns about conflicts of interest, 
bias, and impaired social responsibility in research findings.236  
In particular, commentators have noted that the private indus-
try concepts of profit and competition are at odds with the sci-
entific ideal of objectivity.237  The substantial increase in funding 
of research by private industry has led to growing concern in 
recent years.238  Since 1980,239 private funding of research in all 
  
ample of ethics violations related to intrinsic COIs recently occurred in Singa-
pore.  Is S’pore’s Zeal Sending Wrong Signal?, supra note 205.  In April 2003, 
the director of Singapore’s National Neuroscience Institute was fired following 
revelations that he had conducted experiments on Parkinson’s Disease pa-
tients without their consent and without submitting his research to ethical 
review.  Id.  The press pointed out that Singapore has openly campaigned for 
bring medical researchers to the country using various non-financial incen-
tives.  Id.  An intrinsic financial COI existed as well, in the form of a ten mil-
lion dollar government grant provided to the researcher’s institution for his 
study.  Zuraidah Ibrahim, Medical Ethics? It’s Something Money Can’t Buy, 
STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Apr. 12, 2003, available at 2003 WL 16359084.  See 
also, Move to Plug Loopholes in Medical Research, STRAITS TIMES (Sing,), Apr. 
9, 2003, available at 2003 WL 16358811. 
 235. See, e.g., Henderson & Smith, Institutional Controls, supra note 220, at 
251; Marci Angell, Is Academic Medicine for Sale?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1516, 1517 (2000) (“[C]lose and remunerative collaboration with a company 
naturally creates goodwill on the part of researchers and the hope that the 
largess will continue.  This attitude can subtly influence scientific judgment in 
ways that may be difficult to discern.”). 
 236. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 7.  See also Sameer S. Chopra, 
Industry Funding of Clinical Trials: Benefit or Bias?, 290 JAMA 113, 113 
(2003) (“Corporate financing of clinical research, which often includes incen-
tives for academic investigators, may also create conflicts of interest that can 
bias study results.”); Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial 
Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 
454 (2003) (evidence from multiple academic studies shows that financial ties 
between industry, researchers and research institutions leads to pro-industry 
research results). 
 237. See, e.g., SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 7; Chopra, supra note 
236, at 113. 
 238. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135. 
 239. 1980 is particularly significant to reviews of private industry funding of 
research because this was the year the Bayh-Dole Act (35 U.S.C. § 200 et seq.) 
was passed.  Henderson & Smith, Federal & State Controls, supra note 176, at 
446.  The Bayh-Dole Act changed intellectual property regulation of federally- 
funded research projects.  The Act conferred ownership of intellectual prop-
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scientific arenas increased four hundred percent.240  Private in-
dustry funding of medical research grew at an exponentially 
greater rate, increasing by over thirty-three times (3300%) from 
1980 to 2002.241  A substantial portion of this increase in re-
search expenditures has occurred in the last several years.242  In 
2005, the total U.S. expenditure on biomedical research is esti-
mated to top $100 billion.243 
Financial COIs affect individual researchers as well as the 
institutions in which research is performed.  For the individual 
researcher, financial COIs and apparent COIs occur when the 
researcher has a financial relationship with a research sponsor 
or with the manufacturer of the medical technology being stud-
ied.244  Financial relationships may include ownership of com-
pany stock or stock options, unusually high consulting fees and 
speaking fees paid by manufacturers, or fees paid to community 
physicians for each patient they refer to participate in a com-
pany’s clinical trials.245  Institutional COIs include many of the 
same financial relationships that occur with individual re-
  
erty to the entities that performed research, rather than the federal govern-
ment.  Id.  As a result, the Act allowed universities, nonprofit corporations, 
and other businesses to commercialize federally-funded inventions and new 
technologies by giving these entities the power to patent their work.  Id. 
 240. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 135, at 7. 
 241. U.S. private-industry allocation for medical research in 1980 was ap-
proximately $1.5 billion.  Henderson & Smith, Federal & State Controls, supra 
note 176, at 446.  In 2002, private-industry funding of medical research and 
development activities reached almost $50 billion.  RESEARCH!AMERICA, 2002 
INVESTMENT IN U.S. HEALTH RESEARCH (2004), at http://www.research 
america.org/publications/appropriations/healthdollars2002.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2005). 
 242. See e.g., EVA OHLIN, THE STRUCTURE AND FINANCING OF MEDICAL 
RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2004) (The National Institute of Health, 
the federal government’s major funding agency for medical research, has more 
than doubled its budget since 1998), available at http://www.itps.se/ 
pdf/A2004_006.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); PhRMA 2004 PROFILE, supra 
note 137, at 39 (PhRMA members research and development expenditures 
have double since 1996). 
 243. See OHLIN, supra note 242, at 7.   
 244. Gatter, supra note 216, at 340–48. 
 245. Id. at 340.  Community physicians and physician-researchers are often 
paid between several hundred and several thousand dollars for every patient 
they enroll in an industry-sponsored clinical trial.  Kurt Eichenwald & Gina 
Kolata, Drug Trials Hide Conflicts for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, at 
11. 
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searchers.246  Real and apparent financial COIs at the institu-
tional level occur when the institution has a financial tie to a 
private industry research sponsor through ownership of stocks, 
industry sponsor fees paid to high-ranking individuals247 within 
an institution for patient referrals, and through corporate spon-
sorship of research.248  The issues associated with institutional 
COIs are particularly significant because most regulatory 
schemes make research institutions the primary protectors of 
research participants.249  Regardless of whether the researcher 
or institution holds a conflicting interest, the risk that the con-
flict will interfere with the project and endanger participants is 
of fundamental concern. 
V. REGULATORY REFORM:  RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEES AND 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY 
In the expanding global arena of medical research, the influ-
ence of U.S. regulations is considerable.  Efforts to harmonize 
pharmaceutical regulations have resulted in substantial simi-
larity between U.S. drug regulations and the corresponding 
regulations in many developed and developing nations.250  Addi-
tionally, many clinical trials outside the United States, particu-
larly those in developing nations, are financed by the U.S. gov-
ernment or by corporations that wish to market their product in 
the United States.251  Consequently, these trials are required to 
comply with U.S. regulations.252  As well, many developing coun-
tries conducting clinical trials do not have their own independ-
  
 246. Gatter, supra note 216, at 340–48. 
 247. The COIs of high ranking individuals within an institution are syn-
onymous with institutional COIs because these individuals are the controlling 
body that guide the institution’s actions and behavior.  See, e.g., SHAMOO & 
RESNIK, supra note 135, at 145. 
 248. Gatter, supra note 216, at 342–47. 
 249. Id. at 348. 
 250. See infra Part III.B. 
 251. Adnan A. Hyder et al., Ethical Review of Health Research: A Perspec-
tive From Developing Country Researchers, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 68, 70 (2004) 
(study of researchers in developing nations reported that almost half of all the 
research projects in those countries were funded by U.S. sources); PhRMA 
2004 PROFILE, supra note 137, at 39. 
 252. See infra Part III. 
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ently-created regulations.253  Rather, these countries use U.S. 
regulations as the guide for their medical research programs.254   
This increasingly global reach of U.S. regulations on human 
subject research necessarily extends the problems, as well as 
the benefits, associated with those regulations.  One continuing 
problem is the U.S. government’s failure to give adequate regu-
latory guidance to RECs, researchers and research institutions 
on management of COIs.  RECs are charged with protecting the 
health and safety of research participants.255  They are the ethi-
cal “watchdogs” of biomedical research.256  COIs promote bias 
that has the potential to impact participants’ health and 
safety.257  Yet, this important piece of information—whether a 
researcher has a COI—is often unavailable to the REC charged 
with evaluating a research project.258  As the influence of U.S. 
regulations expands, the failure to adequately deal with COIs, 
“one of the most contentious issues in medicine today,” broad-
ens to become an international issue.259  Now, deficiencies in 
  
 253. See Kass & Hyder, supra note 195, at B-8 (study of U.S. and interna-
tional researchers showed that the vast majority believed that developing 
country investigators “sometimes or always relied on U.S. human subject 
regulations for guidance”); Hyder, supra note 251, at 70 (study showed that 
more than two thirds of researchers in developing nations stated that they 
had relied upon U.S. ethics regulations for guidance).  
 254. Kass & Hyder, supra note 195, at B–8.  Nations may also choose to 
adopt the GCP produced by the ICH (or the similar version published by the 
World Health Organization).  See infra Part II.B.2.  However, adoption of the 
GCP has a similar effect, creating a regulatory system that is almost identical 
to U.S. regulations.  See GLOBALIZATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 34, at 
3. 
 255. See infra Part III. 
 256. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Gold, Watching the Watchdogs: Negligence, Liabil-
ity, and Research Ethics Boards, 11 HEALTH L.J. 153 (2003) (discussing poten-
tial liability of IRBs for failure to take adequate precautions in protecting 
research participants health and well-being); Ho, supra note 205.   
 257. See infra Part IV.  See also Jerome P. Kassirer, Financial Conflicts of 
Interest: An Unresolved Ethical Frontier, 27 AM. L.J. & MED. 149, 153 (2001). 
 258. See,, e.g., Elaine Larson et al., A Survey of IRB Process in 68 U.S. Hos-
pitals, J. NURS. SCHOLARSHIP 260, 261 (2004) (noting that only 10.3% of the 
hospital IRBs surveyed required a conflict of interest statement for a new 
research protocol); S. Van McCrary et al., A National Survey of Policies on 
Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 343 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1621, 1623 (2000) (survey of 235 medical schools and research institu-
tions showed that only three institutions required disclosure of COIs to IRBs). 
 259. Kassirer, supra note 257, at 149. 
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U.S. policy on COIs are potentially injurious to research par-
ticipants within and without the borders of the United States.  
The following sections discuss two regulatory reforms that are 
needed to allow RECs’ review functions to properly align with 
their protective purpose.260 
A. Conflict of Interest Regulation in the United States 
Conflicts of interest261 in medical research are regulated at 
three separate levels in the United States: federal, state and 
institutional.262  These COI policies are directed solely at finan-
cial COIs.  The federal level of COI controls consist of the Com-
mon Rule, Public Health Service (PHS) regulations, and FDA 
disclosure regulations.263  State control over regulation of COIs 
in medical research is not statutory, but emanates primarily 
from state court decisions.264  The vast majority of regulation of 
COIs occurs at the institutional level.265  Based upon the mini-
  
 260. Admittedly, there are many more issues that require consideration 
when discussing realignment of RECs function and purpose; however, this 
discussion will be limited solely to the issue of COIs.  For a few examples of 
IRB reform proposals, see, e.g., Michaele C. Christian et al., A Central Institu-
tional Review Board for Multi-Institutional Trials, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405 
(2002); Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Oversight of Human Participants Research: 
Identifying Problems to Evaluate Reform Proposals, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 282 (2004); Slater, supra note 14, at 1402. 
 261. The term COI in Part V. refers only to financial COIs.  Intrinsic COIs 
would be almost impossible to regulate, as they are very difficult to identify 
and are ubiquitous in clinical research, and are therefore outside the scope of 
this discussion.  See infra Part IV.A.   
 262. See, e.g., Henderson & Smith, Federal & State Controls, supra note 176 
(providing overview of federal and state controls of medical research); Hender-
son & Smith, Institutional Controls, supra note 220 (providing overview of 
institutional controls of medical research). 
 263. 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (2005) (PHS regulation on institutional responsibil-
ity for investigator COIs); 21 C.F.R. § 54 (2004) (FDA regulations regarding 
financial disclosure by investigators).  See also Henderson & Smith, Federal & 
State Controls, supra note 176, at 447. 
 264. Henderson & Smith, Federal & State Controls, supra note 176, at 453–
54 (describing how the California Supreme Court decision in Moore v. Regents 
of University of California, a decision based on lack of valid informed consent, 
also dealt with issues of conflict of interest at the institutional level).  See 
Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 265. Federal regulations delegate the responsibility of creating COI policies 
to individual institutions.  See 42 C.F.R. § 50.604; OFFICE FOR HUMAN 
RESEARCH PROTECTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FINANCIAL 
 
File: Cinead's MACRO 03.30.05.doc Created on:  3/30/2005 2:54 PM Last Printed: 3/30/2005 3:19 PM 
802 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:2 
mal guidance provided by federal regulations, each individual 
institution creates its own COI policy—resulting in policies that 
vary greatly from one institution to another.266  This section em-
phasizes federal COI regulation and the impact of federal regu-
lations on institutional  COI policies. 
There are various federal regulations of financial COIs.  The 
Public Health Service (PHS) and FDA have regulatory provi-
sions for financial COIs.267  However, neither agency’s regula-
tions mention the role and responsibilities of IRBs in disclosure 
policies or management policies for financial COIs.268  Nor do the 
regulations make specific provisions for how research institu-
tions should manage COIs—leaving this component to the dis-
cretion of the institution.269  Notably, the Common Rule, which 
represents the core of federal protections of human research 
subjects, lacks provisions for identification and management of 
institutional or investigator COIs entirely.270   
  
RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERESTS IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS: 
GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECTION (2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 26,393 (2004) 
[hereinafter OHRP Final Guide] (HHS Final Guidance Document discussing 
ways institutions may choose to deal with investigator COIs), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/finreltn/fguid.pdf (last visited Feb.14, 
2005). 
 266. See Van McCrary, supra note 258, at 1621; Henderson & Smith, Insti-
tutional Controls, supra note 220, at 252. 
 267. 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (2005) (PHS regulation on institutional responsibil-
ity for investigator COIs); 21 C.F.R. § 54 (2004) (FDA regulations regarding 
financial disclosure by investigators).  PHS regulations were promulgated in 
1995 and the FDA’s regulations were promulgated in 1998.  OFFICE FOR 
HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH: ISSUES FOR INSTITUTIONS, 
CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, AND IRBS TO CONSIDER WHEN DEALING WITH ISSUES 
OF FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECTION 1 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter OHRP Interim Guide], available at http://www.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/ 
projects/rcr/rcr_conflicts/misc/Ref/OHRP_CoI.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).  
 268. OHRP Interim Guide, supra note 267, at 1. 
 269. PHS regulations require institutions to report the existence of COIs 
and management plans for COIs; however, there is no requirement to report 
the specific details of the COIs or the management plan.  Van McCrary, supra 
note 258, at 1624.  FDA regulations require specific, detailed documentation 
of COIs and management plans, but do not specify any particular manage-
ment protocols that are preferable or considered more trustworthy.  Id. 
 270. Henderson & Smith, Federal & State Controls, supra note 176, at 448.  
The only Common Rule statutory provision for COIs is the restriction of IRB 
membership against any individual who has an interest in the research being 
reviewed by the IRB.  46 C.F.R. § 46.107(e).  The Office for Human Research 
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The lack of specificity in federal regulations has had a signifi-
cant impact upon the development of COI policies at the insti-
tutions where research is conducted.  A national survey of re-
search institutions came to the conclusion that the only univer-
sal feature to all COI policies was that they were totally discre-
tionary.271  Disclosure policies required that investigators dis-
close COIs to another member of the research institution; how-
ever, only one percent of institutions required disclosure to an 
IRB.272  Management of disclosed COIs is even less consistent. 
Many institutions require additional project monitoring, re-
quest investigators withdraw from the project, or require inves-
tigators to divest their interests prior to continuance of the pro-
ject when a COI exists.273  However, none of the institutions re-
quired that COIs should be managed through disclosure to an 
IRB.274   
Inconsistent COI policy at the institutional level reflects the 
lack of specificity at the federal level and makes the need for 
reform clear.  Federal regulations need to specify exactly who 
must be informed of investigator COIs.  So the question then 
becomes: who needs to know about investigator COIs?  The FDA 
requires disclosure of COIs to the agency and to the sponsor of 
the research.275  PHS regulations require that the agency276 and 
  
Protections (OHRP), the main research oversight body of the DHHS, devel-
oped a set of draft interim provisions for identification and management of 
financial COIs in January 2001.  See OHRP Interim Guide, supra note 267.   
In May 2004, the OHRP published the agency’s Final Guidance Document.  
OHRP Final Guide, supra note 265.  However, commentators have suggested 
that the final document “seem[s] to be more suggestions than hard and fast 
recommendation.”  Alicia Ault, HHS Issues Rules on Financial Conflicts, 363 
LANCET 1709, 1709 (2004).  No COI guidance statements have been codified to 
date.  
 271. Van McCrary, supra note 258, at 1622. 
 272. Id. at 1623.  Additionally, only 8% required disclosure to the funding 
agency, 7% disclosed to journals publishing the research and 1%—3 of 250 
institutions—required disclosure to participants.  Id. 
 273. Id.  Subsequent disclosure to the funding agency, modification of the 
research plan, and public disclosure of the COI are other common manage-
ment techniques used by institutions.  Id. 
 274. Id.  None of the management policies required subsequent disclosure to 
research participants.  Id. 
 275. 21 C.F.R. § 54.4. 
 276. In this situation, the agency would also be one of the sponsors, since 
PHS regulations only apply to research projects funded in full or in part by 
the agency.  See infra Part III.A. 
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research institution are informed of investigators’ COIs.277  Fed-
eral agencies, sponsors and institutions are informed.  What 
about the body that is charged by both of these agencies with 
ensuring that research is not initiated unless participants will 
be protected from undue risk?  What about IRBs?  No federal 
regulations specifically require that COIs be disclosed to a re-
viewing IRB.  This failure needs to be remedied.   
The purpose of ethical review is to “contribute to safeguard-
ing the dignity, rights, safety, and well-being of all actual or 
potential research participants.”278  While it is true that IRBs 
are heavily burdened by an ever-increasing load of research 
protocols to review, this does not mean that information on in-
vestigator COIs should be left out of the review process.279  A 
primary function of the IRB is to analyze the protocol and en-
sure that the risks to participants have been accounted for, ac-
knowledged, and then balanced with the potential benefits.280  
COIs, no matter how unlikely they are to actually harm a par-
ticipant, are a risk.  As such, they need to be included in any 
risk/benefit analysis done by an IRB.  Without knowledge of 
investigator COIs, an IRB may not only fail to fulfill one of its 
functions but may also fail in its primary purpose—ensuring 
that research participants health and well-being is protected.  
Additionally, without COI disclosure, IRBs are unaware of the 
potential need for increased and/or more extensive evaluation of 
the project after approval—again interfering with its ability to 
safeguard participants.   
Federal regulatory agencies’ failure to make it clear that 
IRBs need to be provided full documentation of COIs is unac-
ceptable.  Existing regulations merely give lip service to the 
import of COIs and their potential risk to participants.  It is 
time for DHHS and its agencies to provide more definitive, 
  
 277. 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 
 278. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR ETHICS 
COMMITTEES THAT REVIEW BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 1 (2000) (Doc. # TDR/ 
PRD/ETHICS/2000.1), available at http://www.who.int/tdr/publications/public 
ations/pdf/ethics.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).  
 279. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Deputizing Institutional Review Boards to Police 
(Audit?) Biomedical Research, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 267, 293 (2004) (“In the area 
of human research subject protection, better guidance from the FDA, HHS, 
and NIH would have the dual benefit of minimizing inconsistency and reliev-
ing already overburdened IRBs.”). 
 280. See infra Part III.A. 
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harmonized regulations for COIs.281  The best way to begin this 
reform process is to require that IRBs are always provided COI 
disclosure statements and management plans from investiga-
tors.   
B. Regulations Affecting Foreign Clinical Studies 
Changes to U.S. regulations, as described above, will help to 
re-align the purpose and function of research ethics committees 
in the United States and in other nations that host research 
projects funded in full or in part by the U.S. government.282  
However, the scope of U.S. regulatory influence outside the 
United States extends beyond projects that receive funding 
from the U.S. government.  The U.S. market is one of the 
world’s largest consumers of pharmaceuticals and medical de-
vices.283  As such, manufacturers of these products often wish to 
have their products approved for marketing in the United 
States.284  Fortunately for international manufacturers, the FDA 
allows data from foreign clinical studies to be used in the ap-
proval process for drugs and medical devices.285  Most manufac-
  
 281. Even some agencies within the federal government have recognized 
that this is a serious flaw in existing human-subject research regulations.  See 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: HHS DIRECTION 
NEEDED TO ADDRESS FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 22–25 (2001) (Report # 
GAO-02-89), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0289.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2005).  However, action has yet to be taken. 
 282. As noted earlier, the Common Rule and PHS regulations only apply to 
research that is funded, at least in part, by the U.S. government.  See infra 
Part III.A. 
 283. See, e.g., Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Reports 8 Percent Constant 
Dollar Growth in 2002 Audited Global Pharmaceutical Sales to $400.6 Billion 
(Feb. 25, 2003), at http://www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/articleC/0,27 
77,6599_3665_41336931,00.html.  U.S. pharmaceutical sales represented 51% 
of global sales in 2002.  Id.  The second largest pharmaceutical market was 
the European Union, with 22% of global sales.  Id. 
 284. Between 1998 and 2003, the FDA received over 12,000 IND applica-
tions.  Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Original INDs Received 
Calendar Years 1986–2003, FDA Official Website, at http://www.fda.gov/ 
cder/rdmt/Cyindrec.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). 
 285. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120 (2004) (drugs); 21 C.F.R. § 814.15 (2004) (medical 
devices).  FDA policy associated with acceptance of foreign clinical data has 
evolved significantly over the last forty years.  John Gorski, An FDA-EEC 
Perspective on the International Acceptance of Foreign Clinical Data, 21 Cal. 
W. INT’L L.J. 329, 333 (1991).  The FDA allowed foreign clinical data to sup-
plement domestic safety and efficacy findings beginning in 1962.  Id.  Foreign 
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turers file an Investigational New Drug (IND) application with 
the FDA prior to beginning clinical trials.286  However, FDA 
regulations also allow manufacturers to support their market 
approval applications using data solely from previously con-
ducted clinical trials located at foreign sites.287   
In addition to several general technical requirements placed 
upon foreign clinical data, the FDA regulations include an eth-
ics component.288  Specifically, the FDA’s foreign clinical studies 
regulations require collection of clinical data consistent with 
“ethical principles acceptable to the world community.”289  The 
regulations specify adherence to the 1989 Declaration of Hel-
sinki290 or “the laws and regulations of the country in which the 
research was conducted, whichever represents the greater pro-
tection of the individual.”291  Along with other documentary re-
  
clinical data was not allowed as primary safety and efficacy data until 1975, 
but only for drugs that treated uncommon diseases, provided a major health 
gain, or had an exceptionally favorable benefit/risk ratio.  Id.  Starting in 
1984, the FDA accepted foreign clinical data as primary evidence for all drugs 
seeking approval for marketing in the United States.  Id. at 334. 
 286. An IND application based solely on foreign clinical data must meet the 
requirements of 21 C.F.R. § 314.106 (2004).  Foreign clinical trials conducted 
under an IND must meet the same requirements as domestic clinical trials.  
See 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2004).  According to the CDER, approximately 15% of 
trials submitted to the FDA with marketing applications were not conducted 
under an IND.  Human Subject Protection: Foreign Clinical Studies Not Con-
ducted Under an Investigational New Drug Application, 69 Fed. Reg. 32467, 
32471 (proposed June 10, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). 
 287. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120; 21 C.F.R. § 814.15. 
 288. General technical components required by the FDA include: studies 
must be (1) well designed; (2) well conducted; and (3) performed by qualified 
investigators.  21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a).  The data that is submitted to the FDA 
must include: (1) description of investigator’s qualifications; (2) description of 
research facility; (3) summary of the protocol and the study’s results; (4) full 
description of the substance and product used  in the trials; and (5) informa-
tion showing that the clinical trials were adequate and well controlled.  21 
C.F.R. § 312.120(b). 
 289. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a).  The medical device regulations use a slightly 
different wording, requiring that clinical data must be “valid.”  21 C.F.R. § 
814.15(b).  With any application, foreign or domestic, if the FDA considers any 
data suspect, or believes it is unduly biased, the agency can reject the data 
outright.  See Van McCrary, supra note 258, at 1624.  
 290. See infra Part II.  
 291. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(c)(1).  The regulations pertaining to premarket 
approval of medical devices states that an applicant must follow whichever 
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quirements, foreign investigators must submit attestations de-
tailing how their research program complied with the 1989 Dec-
laration292 or the host country’s ethical standards.293   
While the Declaration of Helsinki provides major guidance for 
researchers, the FDA’s insistence on usage of the 1989 Declara-
tion results in an insufficient level of protection for research 
subjects.  The 1989 Declaration has several significant deficien-
cies that reflect that this document is outdated.  For example, 
the 1989 Declaration is not responsive to several of the largest 
issues confronting medical researchers today, including stem 
cell research and use of placebo-controls.294  Additionally, while 
the 1989 Declaration provides that all research proposals must 
be reviewed by an REC, there is no mention of continuing re-
view to ensure that ethical standard are being applied in prac-
tice as well as on paper.295  Key to the discussion of COIs in bio-
medical research, the 1989 Declaration lacks any provisions for 
the disclosure or management of investigator COIs.296   
Significantly, the FDA has recently proposed a major change 
in its foreign clinical studies regulations.297  Acknowledging that 
standards for human subject protection have changed consid-
  
standard “accords greater protection to the human subject.”  21 C.F.R. § 
814.15(b). 
 292. Even though 21 C.F.R. § 312.120 was adopted in 1991, the FDA has 
declined to revise the regulations to include the 1996 or the 2000 revisions of 
the Declaration of Helsinki.  FDA GUIDANCE REPORT, supra note 100.  In a 
2001 published statement, the FDA stated that it was reviewing whether its 
regulations on foreign clinical studies needed revision to incorporate new or 
modified standards.  Id.  No action has been taken to date.  Id. 
 293. If the research protocol followed the host country’s ethical standards 
and regulations, the investigator must provide a written explanation of how 
the host country’s standards are equivalent or superior to the 1989 Declara-
tion.  21 C.F.R. § 312.120(c)(2).  
 294. See generally Forster, supra note 94.  As an example of this assertion, 
one of the amendments to the 2000 Declaration was the addition of specific 
provisions on the use of placebos in medical research.  Id. at 1452.  An adden-
dum on the same subject was added in 2002 in response to extensive discord 
in the ethics community over the use of placebos in developing countries.  Id.  
Additionally, stem cell research would not accurately be regulated by the 1989 
Declaration, as the 1989 Declaration only protects human subjects and not 
“human material.”  Id. at 1451. 
 295. See 1989 DECLARATION, supra note 87. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Human Subject Protection: Foreign Clinical Studies Not Conducted 
Under an Investigational New Drug Application, 69 Fed. Reg. 32,467. 
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erably in the last decade, the agency has proposed removing the 
1989 Declaration from its foreign clinical studies regulations.298  
In its stead, the FDA would require clinical trials to comply 
with the ICH GCP.299  As a more detailed guidance for foreign 
investigators, the inclusion of the ICH GCP will certainly re-
move confusion about FDA documentation requirements and 
the specific responsibilities of various parties in research pro-
grams and marketing approval applications.300    For the pur-
poses of this Note, the question is whether the ICH GCP has 
provisions for COIs.   Unfortunately, since the GCP mirrors 
U.S. human-subject research regulations, it also carries the 
same flaws discussed in the previous section.   The ICH GCP 
requires documentation of financial arrangements among inves-
tigators, institutions and sponsors.301  Yet, these documents are 
only required to be maintained by the sponsor and research in-
stitution.302   As with the 1989 Declaration and U.S. regulations, 
the ICH GCP does not require that RECs are provided COI dis-
closure statements.303   
Current international ethics guidelines reflect recognition for 
the need to include RECs in the management of COIs.  In ac-
knowledging that COIs have the potential to impact research 
participants’ health and well-being, both the 2000 Declaration 
and the 2002 CIOMS Guidelines have made specific provisions 
that require RECs be provided information on investigators’ 
COIs.304  The revision of the Declaration of Helsinki in 2000 
marked several major changes to the Declaration, including the 
  
 298. Id. at 32,468.  The FDA specifically stated that it felt the need to re-
move reference to the 1989 Declaration because modifications to the Declara-
tion are outside of the agency’s authority and “could be modified to contain 
provisions that are inconsistent with U.S. laws and regulations.”  Id. 
 299. Id. at 32,467. 
 300. Id. at 32,468.  See also John Sweatman, Good Clinical Practice: A Nui-
sance, a Help or a Necessity for Clinical Pharmacology?, 55 BRIT. J. CLIN. 
PHARMACOLOGY 1, 2–4 (2003). 
 301. ICH GCP, supra note 30, at 51 (§ 8.2.4).  
 302. Id. 
 303. IRBs are required to be given documentation of payments or compensa-
tion given to research subjects, but the ICH GCP does not mention providing 
IRBs with documentation of investigator’s financial interests with the project 
or its sponsors.  Id. at 10 (§ 3.1.2).  
 304. Provisions on COIs in both of these documents are provided in the re-
mainder of this section.  See supra notes 303–305 (2000 Declaration), 306–308 
(CIOMS Guidelines) and accompanying text. 
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adoption of three separate provisions that include requirements 
for disclosure of COIs.305  Provision 13 of the 2000 Declaration 
includes specific provisions for the information that investiga-
tors are responsible for providing to RECs.306   Under the 2000 
Declaration, researchers are obligated to provide RECs with all 
information necessary for monitoring the project and submit-
ting to the REC all “information regarding funding, sponsors, 
institutional affiliations, [and] other potential conflicts of inter-
est.”307  The 2002 CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for 
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects also ties RECs 
and disclosure of COIs.308  The 2002 Guidelines’ recommenda-
tions on RECs309 include commentary suggesting that RECs 
should be informed by investigators of any potential or appar-
ent financial COIs.310  
  
 305. 2000 DECLARATION, supra note 96.  See also Forster, supra note 94, at 
1449.  Provisions 13, 22 and 27 include provisions for disclosing COIs.  2000 
DECLARATION, supra.  Provision 22 requires disclosure of possible COIs to 
research participants.  Id.  Provision 27 requires disclosure of COIs in publica-
tions of research materials and findings.  Id. 
 306. Id.  Unlike the 1989 Declaration, the 2000 Declaration requires all 
human-subject research be submitted to an independent ethical review com-
mittee.  Id.  Additionally, under the 2000 Declaration, RECs are specifically 
given the right to monitor ongoing research projects.  Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. CIOMS Guidelines, supra note 118. 
 309. CIOMS “Guideline 2: Ethical Review Committees” states: 
All proposals to conduct research involving human subjects must be 
submitted for review of their scientific merit and ethical acceptability 
to one or more scientific review and ethical review committees.  The 
review committees must be independent of the research team, and 
any direct financial or other material benefit they may derive from 
the research should not be contingent on the outcome of their review.  
The investigator must obtain their approval or clearance before un-
dertaking the research.  The ethical review committee should conduct 
further reviews as necessary in the course of the research, including 
monitoring of the progress of the study. 
Id. 
 310. Id.  The CIOMS “Guideline 2: Ethical Review Committees” commen-
tary states: 
Potential conflicts of interest related to project support.  Increasingly, 
biomedical studies receive funding from commercial firms.  Such 
sponsors have good reasons to support research methods that are sci-
entifically and ethically acceptable, but cases have arisen in which 
the conditions of funding could have introduced bias …. As persons 
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A link between RECs and disclosure and management of 
COIs is gaining acceptance as an international standard.  It is 
no longer appropriate for U.S. regulators to hold foreign clinical 
studies to a standard recognized by the international bioethics 
community as insufficient for modern ethical problems.  While 
the FDA’s proposal to replace the 1989 Declaration with the 
ICH GCP will ameliorate several deficiencies within the exist-
ing foreign clinical studies regulations, it still requires further 
amendment.  In order to provide appropriate protection for re-
search participants, U.S. foreign clinical studies regulations 
should respond to the current needs of medical research and 
specifically require review of foreign clinical studies by an REC 
that has been provided documentation regarding investigators’ 
COIs.   
VI.   CONCLUSION 
Intrinsic and financial conflicts of interest are a threat to the 
health and safety of research participants in the United States 
and abroad.  Investment in clinical trials by industry and the 
federal government continues to increase in the U.S. and 
abroad, with industry financing now outpacing the U.S. gov-
ernment.311  With this change in the support structure of clinical 
research, comes an increased likelihood that investigators will 
have financial conflicts with research sponsors that may impact 
the integrity of the project and the safety of participants.  Stud-
  
directly responsible for their work, investigators should not enter into 
agreements that interfere unduly with their access to the data or 
their ability to analyse the data independently, to prepare manu-
scripts, or to publish them.  Investigators must also disclose potential 
or apparent conflicts of interest on their part to the ethical review 
committee or to other institutional committees designed to evaluate 
and manage such conflicts.  Ethical review committees should there-
fore ensure that these conditions are met. 
Id.  Researchers who participate in international clinical trials tend to believe 
that U.S. IRB review and application of U.S. regulatory requirements are 
often inappropriate outside the borders of the United States.  Kass & Hyder, 
supra note 195, at B–64.  Rather, these researchers suggest ethical review in 
the host country and that international guidelines should be the standard for 
evaluating projects; in particular, they suggest using the CIOMS guidelines 
for research in developing countries.  Id.  
 311. See, e.g., PhRMA 2004 PROFILE, supra note 137, at 39; OHLIN, supra 
note 242, at 7. 
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ies have already shown that industry-funded clinical research is 
more likely to favor the sponsor than research conducted inde-
pendent of industry funding.312  Such trends support the asser-
tion that COIs will only increase in the future.  Yet, policies for 
the disclosure and management of COIs are inconsistent or 
non-existent in developed, as well as developing, nations.  This 
failure to adequately provide guidance on investigator COIs 
shows a breakdown in the protection of citizenry that is the 
mandate of national and international health regulators. 
RECs are the bodies that have been consistently charged with 
ensuring the protection of human subjects in medical research.  
It is only logical that they should have access to the same in-
formation that investigators, agencies, and institutions have 
regarding potential risks to research participants.  Yet, they 
often lack any knowledge of investigators’ financial interests 
that may cause bias or inappropriately influence decision-
making.  This failure is unacceptable,   particularly since it is a 
failure easily remedied by simply adding regulations that man-
date disclosure of COIs to IRBs.  While there may be several 
other regulatory changes with greater potential to improve the 
system of human subject protection, this is one of the simplest.  
There is no excuse for the continuing lack of action by the fed-
eral government in this area. 
Influence of U.S. regulations on medical research conducted 
throughout the world is substantial.  With influence, comes re-
sponsibility.  The fact that U.S. regulations propagate policies 
that are inconsistent with the goal of protecting the health and 
safety of research participants is unacceptable.  The United 
States has a responsibility to conduct regulatory reform that  
  
 312. Bekelman, supra note 236, at 454. 
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will more reasonably protect participants and support the pur-
pose of ethical review. 
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